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Introduction
Terror and terrorism: words that are used frequently and can refer to a small child terrorizing
its parents or to political attacks that cause death and most of all fear in society. Although the word 
terrorism seems to be a part of our daily lives, a simple Google search does not give a clear 
definition. Even in literature about the topic it is difficult to find an unambiguous definition of the 
term terrorism. There is no definition of terrorism that is agreed upon on international scale, leaving
room for the term to be used in many different ways, depending on the person or institution that 
uses the word.1 Beatrice de Graaf adds to this by explaining that it is not possible to give a universal
explanation of terrorism since it is so dependent on the user and the political situation.2
Peter Waldmann explains how, for instance, governments can use the word terrorism for 
their own gain and how this can stigmatize groups in ways that might not be justified. He warns that
it is critical, when one uses the word terrorism for research, it is important to keep in mind that 
terrorism does not have to mean the same thing in different situations. To make it more clear for 
researchers, he therefore provides this basic definition of terrorism; ‘Unter Terrorismus sind 
planmäßig vorbereitete, schockierende Gewaltanschläge gegen eine politische Ordnung aus dem 
Untergrund zu verstehen. Sie sollen vor allem Unsicherheit und Schrecken verbreiten, daneben 
aber auch Sympathie und Unterstützungsbereitschaft erzeugen.’3 In his definition the elements 
‘prepared attacks against the establishment that are shocking and next to that create a form of 
sympathy among possible followers’ are the key ingredients that make up terrorism. 
In recent history fundamentalism and terrorism have become common news items. Since the
attacks on the World Trade Center in New York, in 2001, terrorism and Muslim fundamentalism 
seem to be getting more intertwined with the passing of time. An important development since the 
rise of terrorist attacks committed by Muslim fundamentalists, is the way governments, politics and 
media report about terrorism and Islam. Muslims who did not immediately distance themselves 
from terrorist attacks automatically became possible suspects for the authorities. The manhunt for 
Islamic terrorists caused the stigmatization of Muslims, not just for the authorities but in the whole 
society. 
The attacks became a tool for populist politicians and media to scrutinize and slander Islam 
Muslims and non-Western foreigners. After every new attack people started to look more closely at 
the Muslim community in anticipation of their reaction. Instead of seeing the terrorist attacks as 
1 P. Waldmann, Terrorismus. Provokation der Macht (Hamburg, 2005) p. 11
2 B. de Graaf, Theater van de angst. De strijd tegen terrorisme in Nederland, Duitsland, Italie en Amerika. 
(Amsterdam, 2010), p. 16
3 P. Waldmann, Terrorismus. Provokation der Macht (Hamburg, 2005) p. 12
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exception and not inherent to the Islam, it seems that more and more there is the demand of the 
Muslim community to actively distance themselves from terrorist attacks. This in itself implies that 
when Muslims do not distance themselves from terrorist attacks they automatically are assumed to  
endorse the attack and therefore become suspects. Especially with modern technology, news travels 
fast and the Internet is a place that many people use to express their ‘fears’. But terrorism is not 
new, and the way politics, media, the police and the population react to it neither. 
Terrorism is not bound to a time or place. During history there have been several waves and 
forms of terrorism. The groups behind these different waves, according to Peter Waldmann, can be 
defined in the following four categories; social revolutionaries, ethnic nationalists, right-wing 
radicals and religious terrorists.4  The social revolutionaries based their ideas on Marx and focused 
on changing the society with their attacks. The members of these groups often came from the 
middle or higher class in society and unlike popular believe, these groups often had a rather small 
following. In his book 'Terrorismus, Provokation der Macht', Peter Waldman uses the German 
example of the 1970s, consisting of the Rote Armee Fraktion (RAF), Revolutionäre Zellen and 
Bewegung 2. Juni, to explain the motives and ideals behind this form of Terrorists.  
The form of terrorism we are  confronted with in the contemporary society is religious 
terrorism. Due to developments, such as the Internet, which has accelerated communication and 
therefore the radicalization process, people like to think that current day terrorism and terrorism in 
the past are not comparable. Beatrice de Graaf, however, disagrees and explains that current day 
religious terrorism is more comparable with earlier forms of terrorism than most people like to 
admit. She claims that fear of terrorism among the population in Germany and Italy in the 1970s 
was just as high as in the current day situation. (This book was published in 2010, during the six 
years since then there have been several terrorist attacks in Europe which could possibly influence 
this statement) The authorities, furthermore, both today and in the 1970s politicized their policies 
against terrorism. The focus of this research is the reaction from stigmatized groups to the terrorist 
attacks and the politicized policies of the government to counter the attacks.5
Merely belonging to a group linked to terrorism has, in the past, stigmatized certain people. 
In the specific case of West Germany in the 1970s, this group was the left movement. Socialist 
groups have been targeted throughout their history, and with the Cold War at the background, the 
left movement in Western countries had to deal with invasive measures taken by governments out of
fear of socialism. As mentioned before, West Germany was confronted with three different terrorist 
groups, of which the RAF was the best known one. Although the groups caused a nationwide panic, 
4 P. Waldmann, Terrorismus. Provokation der Macht. (Hamburg, 2005) p. 99 – 144
5 B. de Graaf, Theater van de angst. De strijd tegen terrorisme in Nederland, Duitsland, Italie en Amerika. 
(Amsterdam, 2010), p. 23-24
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the actual number of people involved in these groups were rather small. And although known for 
their actions in the 1970s, the RAF existed until 1998 and their roots can be traced back to the 
1960s.
The 1960s and 1970s are decades that appeal to the imagination of a large part of the 
population, both young and old. The 1960s, for which 1968 became the year to represent the whole 
decade in large parts of the world, seems to address the rebel inside of people. The 1970s on the 
other hand seems to represent the feeling of hopelessness and radicalization of small parts of the 
protest movement. Already during the 1960s and 1970s books were written about the left protest 
movement and the radicalization – a fascination that has not stopped. Since that time, hundreds of 
books have been written about the student protest movement and the terrorist groups that arose out 
of them. 
Over time, many writers have analyzed the left movement. This form of literature often 
describes the coming to existence of groups and their development through time. Research on the 
protest movement also often focuses on why the groups were formed and what their ideologies 
were. Because the left movement was particularly outspoken, the first analyses of their actions, 
published in the early 1970s, tended to be written by activists and other members of the same 
movements.  
To get a good overview of the protest movements origins in West Germany in the 1960s 
literature like 'Vom Ostermarsch zur APO. Geschichte der auβenparlementarische Opposition in 
der Bundesrepublik 1960-1970.' written by Karl. A. Otto provides a good base. 'Der Sozialistische 
Deutsche Studentenbund (SDS). Vom parteikonformen Studentenverband zum Repräsentanten der 
Neuen Linken.' written by Willy Albrecht offers a description of a certain group within the left 
movement. Both previous examples focus on the protest movement in the 1960s and their 
development up until that point. More recent literature offers a glimpse in the 1970s. In 'Das Rote 
Jahrzehnte. Unsere kleine deutsche Kulturrevolution 1967 – 1977', Gerd Koenen describes the 
protest movement in a time that was symbolized by left wing radicalism. 
In more recent history, left wing radicalism and terrorism started to gain the attention of 
authors. Like with the protest movement these authors often focus on the development and ideology
of these groups. An extra component is that the authors additionally often pay much attention on the
government and how the interactions between the left movement and the authorities worsened  the 
situation. In her book 'Theater van de Angst. De strijd tegen terrorisme in Nederland, Duitsland, 
Italie en Amerika' Beatrice de Graaf analyses and compares the fight against terrorism in four 
different countries. Karin Hanshew deepens the focus on the fight between authorities and terrorists 
in ' Terror and democracy in West Germany'. 
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A final topic that is popular among historians, sociologists and writers are biographies about 
the main characters of the left movement. Books like 'Wir hatten ein barbarisches, schönes Leben. 
Rudi Dutschke' by Gretchen Dutschke, 'Der Baader Meinhof Komplex' by Stefan Aust and 'Ulrike 
Meinhof. Die Biografie' by Jutta Ditfurth offer a look in the lives of the people that helped shape the
1960s and 1970s. 
It is clear that already a lot of research into the left protest movement, the radicalization and 
the left terrorists in the 1960s and 1970s has been done. But in connection with current day 
terrorism, it also becomes clear that until now there is no research discussing the internal discussion
about violence within the left movement and how this discussion was influenced by certain events. 
As with current day terrorism, the left movement in the 1970s was often expected to distance 
themselves from certain actions in order to not be seen as possible suspects. An aspect that 
contributes to this is their opinion about violence itself. Most socialist movements did not denounce 
violence, since they claim that there has been no non-violent revolution that led to socialism in 
history. 
Every movement is influenced by its surroundings and the same applies to the West German 
left movement of the 1960s. The radicalization of parts of the left movement itself and the state 
response therefore must have influenced the left movement and its inner discourse. In this thesis I 
will therefore look at the influence of the radicalization of small parts of the left movement and the 
actions of the police and government to counter this radicalization on the majority of the left 
movement. I therefore will answer the following question; How was the discourse in the West 
German left movement affected by violence from leftist radicals, and the counter violence from the 
state in the period 1970 – 1972?  
In order to get a clearer picture, different elements in the question need to be answered or 
explained first in order to address the larger issues. Although the timeframe of this research is set 
between 1970 and 1972, one would be lost without knowing what preceded the 1970s. The 
development of Germany after World War II was of great importance to the development of the 
protest movement and the radicalization of parts of that movement in the 1970s. The first chapter 
will therefore give a short history of the development of the West German state from 1945 until the 
1970s and the development of the protest movement in that same time. Since the main question 
contains the development of the discourse within the left movement based on two factors, namely 
the violence shown by the radical left and the counter violence by the authorities, these two 
elements will be separated and explained in two different chapters. How the discourse within the 
left was influenced by left radical violence is subject of chapter two. The third chapter will focus on
how the counter actions of the state against left extremist violence changed the discourse within the 
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movement. In the conclusion I will combine the results of the three chapters and give an answer on 
the main question.
Newspapers are the main sources for this research. In a time before the Internet, newspapers 
functioned as a voice within groups and communities. It was the primary means for communicating 
news, either for a entire nation or just for a certain group.  Other sources like diaries and interviews 
were also considered but are beyond the scope of this project. Newspapers, however, offer an 
insight in the way how different groups thought about certain topics, opposed to just one person, 
and therefore are a manageable source. 
In the main question I talk about the left movement, but the left movement is very broad and
divers. From previous research I was already familiar with Agit 883 and Konkret. Two newspapers 
that were on different positions within the left ideological spectrum. Agit 883 was a radical left 
newspaper mainly distributed in Berlin. It existed between 1969 and 1972 and went through several 
editorial changes. It was the newspaper that published the articles send to them by the RAF,  due to 
this and its radical tone, it was frequently confiscated by the police. Konkret, on the other hand was 
a weekly magazine that was popular among left intellectuals. The magazine published long articles, 
but had a highly sexualized nature during the late 1960s and early 1970s.
The other newspapers that were used for this research are the Rote Fahne, Roter Morgen, 
Rote Presse Korrespondenz and Vorwärts. The first three newspapers belonged to the 
Kommunistische Kleinparteien (K-Gruppen), groups that came into existence after the APO had 
fallen apart in 1968. On the ideological spectrum these newspapers were in between Agit 883 and 
Konkret. Ideologically the groups behind the three different newspapers were similar, with double 
membership not being an exception. Even though these groups and the newspapers were similar, 
they did have small differences in how they presented their opinion about certain events that are 
important for this research.
The final newspaper used for this research is Vorwärts. Vorwärts is the newspaper of the 
social democratic party, SPD. The SPD was the biggest social democratic party in West Germany 
and in the government. The SPD and therefore Vorwärts can probably best be placed on the right 
side of Konkret on the left ideological spectrum. Although the SPD and Vorwärts were part of the 
left ideological spectrum, their position is interesting since it was a left party that at that point was 
in a coalition with the Freie Demokratische Partei (FDP) and delivered the Bundeskanzler, Willy 
Brandt. Opposed to the other groups and newspapers, the SPD was responsible for government 
policy and police actions, something that influenced the discourse within the left movement greatly.
Newspapers are also a problematic source. The goal of this research is to see how the 
discourse within the left movement changed due to external factors. Even though newspapers 
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represent the ideology of a larger group within the society this source also bares problems. Firstly, 
the opinions published in newspapers come from journalists and has likely been checked by the 
editors or publishers. The function of a journalist should be to report objectively, this, however, 
might be one of the hardest tasks of a journalist since it is near to  impossible to report objectively.  
Compounding this first problem is the issue that instead of only representing opinions and 
discourses, newspapers might also want to influence these opinions or discourses. The newspaper of
a political party like the SPD will mostly report positive about that political party in order to 
promote the political party. A communist newspaper is more likely to be biased about police actions
than about provoking actions from within their own group. Besides offering a platform for 
discourses of groups, newspapers are also initiators of certain directions within that discourse. 
Using such sources also raised the issue of how representative these publications were of a 
wider discourse within the left movement. Newspapers were not only seen by the members of the 
group it represented, the police and authorities also had access to the newspapers. It is therefore 
highly likely that the written discourse was slightly different from the oral discourse. A problem 
that, with more time and resources, could be limited by adding diaries and interviews. This 
research, however, will show the changing discourse based on newspapers.  
Since this research focuses on the changing discourse caused by left radical violence and the
counter actions of the police and authorities I made a list of important dates between 1970 and 1972
that likely influenced the discourse. This chronology is based on a time line presented by Ron 
Augustin on the website of the IISH and the literature used for this research. This chronology 
provided a helpful hand while going through the newspapers. This process yielded a schematic 
overview of the left movement’s reactions to radical violence and subsequent state response. 
The methodology for the first chapter is fairly simple since its main goal is to give an 
overview of the West German developments. To link the West German developments with the 
development of the protest movement in West Germany, I used time frames that seem logical and 
that are also used in other literature. For these time frames I explain the general/political 
developments in West Germany and afterwards the development of the West German protest 
movement in that same time frame. This allows the reader to connect the two different 
developments together.   
Chapter two and three I decided to write in a chronological order, using the table and the 
overview of noteworthy events as a guideline. The structure, therefore, is mainly built around the 
noteworthy events. I use these events to describe the reactions, or the lack of reactions, of the 
different newspapers. Besides describing the content of the articles and comparing them with each 
other I will analyze how the discourse within the different newspapers changed over time and how 
8
this was similar or different when compared to each other. This methodology will give the most 
clear analysis possible on the development of the discourse within the left movement. 
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chapter 1
The development of West German politics and the west
German protest movement between 1945-1970
With this paper I would like to show how the discourse within the left movement in West 
Germany was affected by left wing radical violence and the counter reaction of the police. As is 
described in the introduction, however, before I can do this it is of great importance to first get a 
general understanding of certain developments in West Germany in order to understand the actions 
and reactions of the protest movement and government between 1970 – 1972. This introductory 
chapter will therefore provide a description of the development of the West German politics and the 
development of the West German protest movement between 1945 and 1970. Since most history 
books about German political history tend to divide their chapters in the same way, based on the 
consecutive governments, I will also use this structure. After every political phase I will describe 
the development of the left protest movement in that same time period so it is clear how these two 
were influenced by each other.
1945 might seem a logical year to start since it marked the end of World War II, but I will 
first explain why I choose this year and not for instance the founding year of the SPD in 1863 or 
1966, the year that by many is seen as the year the protest movement came into existence. A general
history of the left movement would be interesting since many left movements tend to fall back on 
their history or the history of socialism in general and the struggles it went through. Describing the 
history of the left movement would be to large for this research and would furthermore distract from
the real question at hand. If I were to use 1966 as a beginning point it would be to late. Although 
that year is seen as the starting point of the protest movement due to the political developments and 
the visibility of the protest movement, the movement itself already had its roots in the 1950s. It was 
exactly the post-war period and the generation gap between the war generation and the post-war 
generation, that formed the protest movement in the 1960s and the radicalization in the 1970s. 
In 1945 a ruined Germany had to pick up the pieces, rebuild the country and deal with a 
guilt ridden past. With the unconditional surrender on 8 May 1945 Germany handed over its powers
to the allied forces, who took over complete control over Germany. During the Potsdam Conference
between 17 July and 2 August 1945, the four allied powers came together to decide about the post-
war period and the future of Germany. Many of the decisions made during the Potsdam Conference 
were already made during World War II. One of the main decisions and the one that would have the 
most impact in the years to follow, was the dividing of Germany and Berlin in four different 
10
influence zones; one for each allied power. In addition, a control council was set up on 30 August 
1945, between the four allied countries for the governing of Germany.6 
The German population was suffering heavily after the end of the war, experiencing hunger, 
deaths and the displacement of people. On top of that, they were forced to come to terms with living
under a dictatorship for 12 years. Against this background, the allied powers immediately started to 
reform Germany. These reforms can be summarized under the four D’s; Demilitarisierung, 
Dekartelisierung, Denazifizierung and Demokratisierung.7 With taking control over the whole 
country and forbidding the army, the first two were quickly met, however the process of 
denazification and democratization were more intense. 
Every organization or company that was somehow involved with national socialism was 
forbidden, and as early as 1945, the Nürnberg trails started to prosecute the responsible people for 
the atrocities committed during the war. In addition, every occupying power could decide how it 
would pursue the denazification and democratization in their influence zone, resulting in very 
different policies. With regards to the denazification process, the United States, in comparison with 
the British and the French, was the most strict. They imposed a classification process by which 
every German person was judged according to what extent they supported, condoned or opposed 
the Nazi Regime. In the Soviet zone, every person that had ownership of property, whether they 
were involved with national socialism or not, was subjected to denazification, in order to restructure
the society.8 
It were not only the allied powers who were interested in the denazification of Germany, 
also parts of the German population themselves were very keen to denazify the population. These 
people included many of the opposition members to the Nazi regime, of whom many had spent their
time during the war in concentration camps. After the war they tried set up ‘Antifa Ausschusse’ but 
these were short lived. The reason for this is interpreted differently by different authors, Rolke for 
instance describes in his book that although the Allied powers appreciated the effort of the ‘Antifa 
Ausschusse’ the people were too worn of by the war to have a real impact on the denazification 
process.9 Horst Pötzsch, on the other hand, describes that the efforts of the Antifa Ausschusse were 
not in the interest of the Allied powers and were therefore shut down quickly.10
Although the initial reaction of the Allied powers was to punish Germany for the war, it soon
6 H. Pötzsch, Deutsche Geschichte von 1945 bis zur Gegenwart. Die Entwickelung der beiden deutschen Staaten und
das vereinte Deutschland. (München, 2009) p. 24-29
7 L. Rolke, Protestbewegung in der Bundesrepublik. (Opladen, 1987) p. 119
8 H. Pötzsch, Deutsche Geschichte von 1945 bis zur Gegenwart. Die Entwickelung der beiden Deutschen Staaten 
und das vereinte Deutschland. (München, 2009) p. 39-42
9 L. Rolke, Protestbewegung in der Bundesrepublik. (Opladen, 1987) p. 123
10 H. Pötzsch, Deutsche Geschichte von 1945 bis zur Gegenwart. Die Entwickelung der beiden Deutschen Staaten 
und das vereinte Deutschland. (München, 2009) p. 47
11
became clear that this would not lead to a longterm solution for recovering Germany and with that, 
the world economy. On 5 June 1947, secretary of state George Marshall, together with President 
Truman attended a presentation at Harvard University that pleaded against hunger and poverty.  
Inspired by this the United States changed its policy at the end of 1946 and introduced the Marshall 
plan in 1947.11 After the collaboration during World War II and the initial cooperation during the 
after war years, the former eastern and western allies soon became hostile towards each other, due 
to different interests. International developments like the Truman Doctrine would drive the United 
States and the Soviet Union even further apart with great consequences for Germany and Berlin. On
16  June 1948, the Soviet Union left the control council for Germany, marking the end of the 
collaboration between the Western Allies and the Soviet Union. This lead to the blockade of Berlin 
between 24 June 1948 and 12 Mai 1949.12 
The developments in 1948 and 1949 showed that the Soviet Union was not focused on 
reuniting Germany and left East Germany financially depended on the Soviet Union. As a reaction, 
the Western Allies decided to create one state out of the west-zones.13  On 8 May 1949, the 
Parlamentarische Rat, under the presidency of Conrad Adenauer, voted for the ‘Basic Law’, which 
was then installed in all the west-zones on 23 May 1949. With that the Bundes Republik 
Deutschland (BRD) was formed. As a counter reaction the Deutsche Demokratische Republik 
(DDR) was formed in the Soviet influence zone on 7 October in the same year. The devision of 
Germany was an undeniable fact.14 It is important to note that the basic law did not include a clause 
for emergency laws. The drafters of the basic law did not include the emergency laws because it 
were these laws in the Weimarer Verfassung that Hitler used to gain complete control over Germany
during the 1930s.  Due to this, the Allied powers remained in control over both external and internal
emergencies in West Germany until these laws were added in 1968.
Between 1945 and 1949 the German population was heavily dependent on the Allied 
powers, not just for governing political life but also for their personal life. Life was tough in the 
immediate post-war years and a longing for normality was prominent. As described before, the 
allied powers initially forbade all organizations in Germany after World War II. New organizations 
had to apply for permission from the different occupying states. Already in 1945 different 
organizations started to emerge or re-emerge. These often started without permission with the aim 
11 H. Pötzsch, Deutsche Geschichte von 1945 bis zur Gegenwart. Die Entwickelung der beiden Deutschen Staaten 
und das vereinte Deutschland. (München, 2009) p. 55 - 57
12 H. Pötzsch, Deutsche Geschichte von 1945 bis zur Gegenwart. Die Entwickelung der beiden Deutschen Staaten 
und das vereinte Deutschland. (München, 2009) p. 68 - 70
13 H. Pötzsch, Deutsche Geschichte von 1945 bis zur Gegenwart. Die Entwickelung der beiden Deutschen Staaten 
und das vereinte Deutschland. (München, 2009) p. 72 - 76
14 H. Pötzsch, Deutsche Geschichte von 1945 bis zur Gegenwart. Die Entwickelung der beiden Deutschen Staaten 
und das vereinte Deutschland. (München, 2009) p. 76 - 80
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to gain it later, some of these organizations that already emerged in 1945 would prove to be 
important in the 1960s and 1970s protest movements. 
The first one to emerge was the Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands (KPD). The KPD 
came into existence in 1917 when a group within the SPD separated themselves over ideological 
differences. 15 Like all other political parties and associations they were forbidden during National 
Socialism. After the war, the KPD was quick to rebuild itself and was re-founded on 11 June 1945.16
This re-founded KPD was forbidden by West Germany in 1956 as a hostile organization towards 
democracy. This had to do with the fact that since 1919 the KPD had been a member of the 
‘Kommunistische Internationale’ and therefore had ties with the Soviet Union; a connection that 
was not very welcome during the Cold War in the West.17 Although the different KPD groups that 
emerged in the 1970s had lost most of their connections to the pre- and immediate post-war 
organization, they did see themselves as a reincarnated form of the original KPD.18 
The other organization that already emerged in the immediate aftermath of the war was the 
Sozialistische Deutsche Studentenbund (SDS). This organization was founded by a small group of 
students that started to gather at the end of 1945. The SDS was officially founded in Hamburg and 
Munster at the beginning of 1946 when the first official debate-club licenses were submitted. The 
official Gründungkongres took place from 3 until 6 July 1946.19 The SDS was quick to seek contact 
with the SPD and on 5 January 1947 they had the first joined conference.20 This collaboration lasted
until 1960, when the SPD stopped the collaboration due to the activities of the SDS in the Kampf 
dem Atomtod movement.21  The SDS played a major role in the Außer Parlementarische Opposition
(APO) and protest movements in the 1960s in West Germany.
In the political field, the 1950s were the era of Adenauer and the Wirtschaftswunder. On 14 
August 1949, the Bundestag was elected. On 15 September 1949 they voted for Conrad Adenauer 
(CDU) to be Bundeskanzler. With regards to these events the allied powers handed over most of the 
powers to the new West German Government. The demilitarization process, on the other hand, and 
the right to intervene in emergency situations, stayed under allied control. The Western Allies 
therefore maintained the power to intervene in national and international emergency situations and 
15 A.Pfahl-Traughber, Linksextremismus in Deutschland. Eine kritische Bestandsaufnahme. (Wiesbaden, 2014) p. 69
16 H. Bilstein/ S. Binder/ M. Elsner/ H. U. Klose/ I. Wolkenhaar, Organisierte Kommunismus in der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland. DKP-SDAJ-MSB Spartakus-KPD/KPD (ML)/KBW/KB. (Opladen, 1977) p.14
17 A. Pfahl-Traughber, Linksextremismus in Deutschland. Eine Kritische Bestandsaufnahme. (Wiesbaden, 2014). p. 77
18 G. Koenen, Das rote Jahrzehnte. Unsere kleine deutsche Kulturrevolution 1967 – 1977, (Köln, 2001), p. 140 - 145
19 W. Albrecht, Der Socialistische Deutsche Studentenbund (SDS). Vom parteikonformen Studentenverband zum 
Repräsentanten der Neuen Linken. (Bonn, 1994) p. 36 - 37
20 W. Albrecht, Der Socialistische Deutsche Studentenbund (SDS). Vom parteikonformen Studentenverband zum 
Repräsentanten der Neuen Linken. (Bonn, 1994) p. 108 - 111
21 W. Albrecht, Der Socialistische Deutsche Studentenbund (SDS). Vom parteikonformen Studentenverband zum 
Repräsentanten der Neuen Linken. (Bonn, 1994) p. 310 - 312
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when the democracy was in danger.22 
The newly formed government faced several challenges, such as rebuilding the economy 
and solving the displacement problem. Furthermore, they needed to decide how to handle foreign 
affairs in a time when they were officially not allowed to intervene in emergency situations but 
found themselves at the center of a global crisis. To rebuild the economy, the Adenauer government 
introduced the ‘social market economy’.23 Although considered a ‘risky experiment’ at the time, the 
gamble paid off and West Germany underwent a magnificent economic growth, with unemployment
rates plummeting from 12,2% in 1950 to 1,3% in 1960.24 This phenomenon is referred to as the 
Wirtschaftswunder. It is worth mentioning that, initially, only people in the workforce benefited 
from this economic growth; elderly people and people with disabilities had to wait until 1957, when
a new form of social security was introduced.25
In the field of international politics the West German government found itself in a difficult 
situation. The government regained a lot of sovereignty, but the Allied powers were still in control 
over West German foreign affairs. This however did not mean that foreign affairs were not on the 
political agenda for the Adenauer government. The first issue they had to deal with was, whether the
West German government would focus on trying to reunite Germany or on maintaining their 
connections to the West. Under the strong hand of Adenauer, the Government focused on a strong 
connection with the Western powers. This resulted in a collaboration between European countries, a
development that among others became the basis for the European Union.26 
Another issue regarding international politics was the Cold War and the demilitarization of 
Germany. With the Cold War on the rise the Allied powers had already discussed the possibility of 
rearming West Germany in the late 1940s. The need for rearmament became more present in 1950, 
when it became clear that the Soviet Union posed a considerable threat. Between 1950 and 1955 the
possibility of a West German army was discussed at several conferences. These series of 
conferences were finalized on 23 October 1954, with the signing of the Bonn-Paris conventions. 
These conferences were the embodiment of the West defense strategy against the rising threat of the
Soviet Union. During these conferences it was, among others, specified that West Germany would 
22 H. Pötzsch, Deutsche Geschichte von 1945 bis zur Gegenwart. Die Entwickelung der beiden Deutschen Staaten 
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24 H. Pötzsch, Deutsche Geschichte von 1945 bis zur Gegenwart. Die Entwickelung der beiden Deutschen Staaten 
und das vereinte Deutschland. (München, 2009) p. 97
25 H. Pötzsch, Deutsche Geschichte von 1945 bis zur Gegenwart. Die Entwickelung der beiden Deutschen Staaten 
und das vereinte Deutschland. (München, 2009) p. 98-99
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join NATO, which required West German rearmament.27 In January 1955, West Germany rearmed, 
10 years after the ending of World War II. Between 1955 and 1957 it also became clear that the 
United States wanted to put nuclear warheads on European soil. Despite fears of inner political 
struggles, the Bundestag voted in favor of allowing the USA to place nuclear warheads in West 
Germany in April 1958.28
When looking at the protest movement we tend to automatically look at the year 1968. That 
was the year that protest movements and social justice movements were very active around the 
world and it is therefore remembered as an historic year with regards to civil resistance. After this 
year many movements started to lose momentum as some parts began to radicalize, in extreme 
situations towards terrorism. Although 1968 and its aftermath went into the history books, the 
protest movement predates 1968. It already found its roots in the 1950s. 
As mentioned before, the possibility of rearmament arose in 1950. These plans were not 
hugely popular amongst the population. With two wars behind them and an active demilitarization 
process right after World War II,  most Germans were understandably not happy with this prospect. 
Another cause for people to protest was that, alongside remilitarization, there was the possibility of 
reinstalling conscription.29 
Between 1950 and 1952 there were several demonstrations that reached a peak in 1952. On 
11 Mai 1952, approximately 30 000 young people came together to demonstrate against the 
potential military service, despite the demonstration being forbidden by the local government the 
previous day. It resulted in several arrests and the death of a demonstrator.30 Because many of the 
demonstrations in the early 1950s were not properly coordinated and no organized opposition 
resulted from the protests, they failed to leave an impact and Adenauer was able to finalize his 
plans.31
Although the protests against re-militarization had calmed down after 1952 and no political 
change had occurred, several organizations and associations did feel an impact themselves. In 1951 
the KPD and SPD, together with other organizations that were against re-militarization, wanted to 
do a national survey with the following question; 'Sind Sie gegen die Remilitarisierung 
Deutschlands und für den Abschluß eines Friedensvertrages mit Deutschland im Jahre 1951?'.32 
27 H. Pötzsch, Deutsche Geschichte von 1945 bis zur Gegenwart. Die Entwickelung der beiden Deutschen Staaten 
und das vereinte Deutschland. (München, 2009) p. 95
28 H. Pötzsch, Deutsche Geschichte von 1945 bis zur Gegenwart. Die Entwickelung der beiden Deutschen Staaten 
und das vereinte Deutschland. (München, 2009) p. 135-137
29 K. A. Otto, Vom Ostermarsch zur APO. Geschichte der außerparlementarische Opposition in der Bundesrepublik 
1960-1970 (Frankfurt am Mein/ New York) p. 54
30 L. Rolke, Protestbewegung in der Bundesrepublik. (Opladen, 1987) p. 170
31 L. Rolke, Protestbewegung in der Bundesrepublik. (Opladen, 1987) p. 170 - 172
32 L. Rolke, Protestbewegung in der Bundesrepublik. (Opladen, 1987) P. 164
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The idea behind the national survey was that the outcome would be send to the government and that
it would be used to start discussions.33 The national survey was disregarded by the government and 
the SPD distanced itself from it. The government even decided that the national survey was 
unlawful. '… wurde durch einstimmigen Kabinettsbeschluß die Volksbeffragung mit der 
Begründung verboten, daß sie einen 'Angriff auf die verfassungsmäßige Ordnung' der 
Bunderrepublik darstelle'.34 All the organizations that were linked with the national survey were 
banned, with this the government managed to forbid the KPD in 1956, as an organization that was 
disrupting the democracy of West Germany.35 
To ban an organization under the claim that it was a subversive and anti democratic 
organization fitted in the form of democracy that was founded in West Germany. In the immediate 
post-war years it became clear that all the parties involved in rebuilding a new government agreed 
on a strong democracy that was able to withstand threats against democracy. The wish to prevent 
what happened during the 1930s was very strong. This resulted in a militant democracy.36 In this 
search to protect democracy every political party was bound to the Basic Law, every undemocratic 
political party could be banned. Every attack against the state was seen as an attack against the free 
will of the individual.37
In the second half of the 1950s the discussion about rearmament among the population 
slowly started to escalate when the population became aware of the possibility of nuclear weapons 
to be placed on West German ground. A campaign to protest against the nuclear weapons was 
founded under the slogan ‘Kampf dem Atomtod’.38  It led to a large demonstration in 1958, but 
despite these protests the government agreed on the nuclear warheads and the majority of the 
protests fell quiet. Although these demonstrations did not have the desired outcome, small groups of
people kept demonstrating against nuclear weapons in the following years.39 From 1960 on, these 
small demonstrations would become known as the ‘Ostermarsches’. This movement organized an 
annual demonstration during the Easter holidays to protest against the atomic bomb and the war in 
Asia. 
These Ostermarsch-bewegung consisted of members of the SDS (mentioned earlier in the 
text), pacifists and religious groups.40 The inspiration for these demonstrations came from the 
33 K. Hanshew, Terror and democracy in West Germany. (Cambridge, 2012) p. 59 – 63
34 L. Rolke, Protestbewegung in der Bundesrepublik. (Opladen, 1987) P. 165
35 L. Rolke, Protestbewegung in der Bundesrepublik. (Opladen, 1987) p. 165 - 170
36 K. Hanshew, Terror and democracy in West Germany. (Cambridge, 2012) p. 34 - 35
37 K. Hanshew, Terror and democracy in West Germany. (Cambridge, 2012) p. 43 - 44
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United Kingdom where the ‘campaign for Nuclear Disarmament’ (CND) had organized a large 
protest march to protest against the Atomic Bomb. In West Germany and other countries, 
organizations inspired by the CND started to emerge. The West German movement organized 
demonstrations under the name 'Ostermarsch der Atomwaffengegner', with slogans like 'Kampf dem
Atomtod'. Initially the movement was non political and just protested against the Atomic Bomb, but 
with time the movement became more political as more people joined.41
In the 1960s the era of Adenauer started to crumble. Due to some unfortunate political 
decisions and scandals like the ‘Spiegel-Affäre’, Adenauer, who by this time was already 87 years 
old, stepped down as Bundeskanzler in 1963.42 Adenauer was replaced by Ludwig Erhard between 
1963 and 1966, but he was confronted with an economical recession, left over from the Adenauer 
years.43 The CDU had governed West Germany for little over ten years and had rebuild the country 
and created economic prosperity, but in the early 1960s, with the economy declining, the CDU 
government lost support among the population. Although, still popular amongst the population, the 
CDU did not receive enough votes during the 1965 Bundestag elections to form a government on its
own.44 At the same time the SPD gained in popularity. This led to the CDU/CSU and the SPD 
forming a government together. Due to the size of this coalition, it is referred to as the ‘Große 
Koalition’. Consequently this meant that the opposition in the Bundestag lost its significance.45 
As mentioned before, the in 1949 created Basic Law, did not include emergency laws. Not 
only because it was not necessary, due to the control of the Allied powers, but also because they 
knew at the time it would be a difficult clause to include. However, during the 1950s the power and 
role of West Germany had considerably changed. With the entrance of West Germany to NATO, re-
militarization and international concerns getting more tense by the day, voices in the government 
felt that emergency laws were needed. In 1960 there had already been an attempt to add them to the 
Basic Law. At that time it was the SPD that voted against the proposal because they felt that the 
proposed law would give too much power to the executive in times of emergency.46 The Große 
Koalition continued the debate on the emergency laws and after some changes in the proposal, to 
1960-1970 (Frankfurt am Mein/ New York) p. 69 - 73
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ensure democratic rights even in situations of emergency, the law was passed on 30 May 1968.47
Due to these political developments, the protest movement in West Germany slowly started 
to take shape in the 1960s. The aforementioned Ostermarsch Bewegung, that initially was only 
known for its single issue protests against the atomic bomb, started to become more political as it 
widened its goals to a total disarmament. The movement changed its name in September 1962 from 
‘Ostermarsch bewegung’ to ‘Ostermarsch der Atomwaffengegner – Kampagne für Abrüstung’. That
same year the amount of participants rose from 9000 to 15 000. Similarly, the number of people 
signing their proclamation rose annually, with about 3000 signatures in 1963 to 8000 in 1964. 
Among those signing were pastors, lawyers, teachers, professors and more.48 
The politicization of the movement seemed to go hand in hand with international crisis, such
as the Berlin crisis in the late 1950s and the Cuba crisis in 1962. Among the participants of the 
movement there were many people with communist sympathies. The politicization of the movement
furthermore attracted former KPD members. Although it was labeled a ‘front organization’ for 
banned communist parties in 1967, the government showed an early interest in the movement and 
began to oppress the movement, both political and through police force starting from 1962.49 
In England the CND movement started to openly talk about deliberately ignoring the law 
during protests. This idea crossed borders and led to the discussion in the West German movement 
whether to show civil disobedience. Initially this was in the form of passive aggressive protests, 
such as sit ins and teach ins, to gain more attention for their causes. However, this soon turned into 
more aggressive interactions with the police. The first of these more aggressive protests began in 
1964. In that year the president of Congo, Moise Tsjombe, visited West Germany. Many people 
opposed the visit because of allegations against Tsjombe for assassinating his political opponent. 
This led to, what Jacco Pekelder describes as, the first protest where the law was actively and 
deliberately broken by protesters. A group of protesters, who were led by Rudi Dutschke, the future 
president of the SDS, pelted the car of the Congolese president with Tomatoes.50 From 1965 
onwards, the reasons to protest expanded, both internationally and nationally, with the start of the 
Vietnam War from the mid 1960s and the actions of the Große Koalition. 
With the election in 1965 it became clear that the opposition lost much of its powers in the 
government. This resulted in the start of the Außerparlamentarische Opposition (APO). Until 1964 
47 H. Pötzsch, Deutsche Geschichte von 1945 bis zur Gegenwart. Die Entwickelung der beiden Deutschen Staaten 
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the discussion about the atomic bomb and rearmament were the central debate within the protest 
movement. From 1965 onwards the discussion became clearly more political and the APO became 
the central debate within the protest movement.51 With the previously mentioned elections in 1965 
the APO soon gained of considerable importance. The APO consisted of different organizations that
came together in their struggle against militarization and the desire for the democratization of the 
society. 
By 1962/63 the SDS just had a small amount of members left and the disbanding of the 
organization had been discussed. Due to strong rhetorics within the organization it managed to  
rebuild itself into the strongest student organization in the late 1960s. In 1966 the SDS was, besides 
the KfA, the strongest, radical democratic movement. Although the organizations were separate, the
SDS motivated its members to join the KfA in their demonstrations.52 One of the slogans that was 
introduced in 1966 was ‘Notstand der Demokratie’. This idea helped the different APO 
organizations to unite in mass protests against the government. 
The KfA was a one issue movement, and, although important, it was too limited. The SDS, 
on the other hand, wanted to unite all the APO organizations into a united socialist movement that 
would have a wide support base.53  Under influence of the SDS, the APO expanded its repertoire 
beyond just demilitarization. A new proposal for emergency laws became one of the main targets of 
the APO movement between 1966 and 1968, largely due to its connection to demilitarization. Other 
topics that were  added to the APO agenda were the reforms at the universities, denazification of 
high-standing positions in West Germany, capitalism and the war in Vietnam. 
The KfA did not have a specific political mandate, while the SDS was clearly left. As 
mentioned earlier, the KfA was already surveyed by the government in the early 1960s, due to the 
fact that the government thought that communists were in the movement. The SDS on the other 
hand was an openly leftist organization and started to align itself with communist groups and 
organizations like the Vietcong. This mistrust of the government in the protest movement continued 
throughout its existence. The mass demonstrations, organized from 1966 on, often ended in clashes 
with the police. 
The link between the protest movement in West Germany and history has already been made
in the form of the Notstandsgesetze. Besides the earlier mentioned topics, the National Socialist past
of Germany was of high influence on the forming of the protest movement in the 1960s. The 
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national socialist past and with that the reinstatement of emergency laws were the embodiment of 
the generation conflict in West Germany. For the post-war generation it was hard to come to terms 
with what happened during World War II. The fact that in many cases their parents either actively 
took part in the regime or offered no resistance, and that many high functions in West Germany 
were still held by former National Socialists caused for misunderstanding among the youth. The 
protest movement confronted the older generation with a history they rather wanted to forget. A 
confrontation that was, therefore, not welcomed by the older generation and the government.54 
Another issue that caused for great distress within the government was the fact that the 
protest movement directed their protests against the main ally of West Germany, namely the United 
States. Protests were therefore often broken up, this, as a consequence, often accumulated into 
violence between the police forces and the demonstrators.55 Besides this clash between 
demonstrators and government, there was another factor that was of great influence on the protest 
movement, namely the populist press. News sources, like the Axel Springer group, often wrote in a 
negative way about the protest movement, resulting in the stigmatization of the group.56  
The demonstration on 2 June 1967, held against the visit of the Shah of Iran was particularly 
violent between the police and the protesters. This demonstration congregated in front of the 
Deutsche Oper in West Berlin. A group of Shah supporters also appeared and began to use the sticks
of their banners to attack the crowd. The police joined the Shah supporters and started to beat down 
members of the crowd. The protesters, which included families with young children and elderly 
people, panicked and the event resulted into chaos. In the panic, Benno Ohnesorg, a 26 year old 
student and a first-time demonstrator, was killed by a police bullet in the back of the head.57 The 
police claimed it was out of self defense, however, pictures and witnesses of the event would claim 
otherwise. The news of his death caused a shock through the student protest movement and caused 
even more distrust towards the police and the government than before. 
The feud between the protesters and the establishment would reach its climax in April 1968, 
when Rudi Dutschke, the main speaker of the protest movement, was shot by a right wing worker, 
rumored to be aspired to do so by an article written in one of the newspapers of Axel springer. Rudi 
Dutschke would die ten years later due to the effects of the attack, but it was initially unclear for the
outside world, whether he had survived the attack in general.58 The public initially assumed he was 
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dead. People, on mass, took to the streets to protest against Axel Springer, causing large destruction 
and chaos. This was the moment where for many people, both from inside and outside the 
movement, a line was crossed. Already before the attack on Dutschke there was the question 
whether violence was allowed, and if yes only against material goods or also against humans. 
During the aftermath of the attempted murder of Dutschke protesters started to use violence against 
material goods and humans, since for the second time in two years ‘one of their own’ was shot. This
display of violence was one of the main breaking points within the protest movement.59
 The yearly recurring Sternmarsch nach Bonn on 11 Mai 1968, was the last big action of the 
APO and the protest movement. The Sternmarsch was held short before the vote on the 
Notstandsgesetze to, once again, show their opposition to the discussed law. The law was passed, 
despite heavy opposition from the society. Together with the rise in violence and the passing of the 
emergency laws the protest movement started to fall apart.60 
Another factor that contributed to the falling apart of the movement was the fact that more 
and more young people, who had no political experience, started to join the movement. These 
young people were more impressed by the guerrilla battles in far away countries than by the actions 
being held within West Germany. This resulted in a new generation gap within the protest 
movement, causing many more experienced members to leave the movement.61  
The invasion of Czechoslovakia by the Soviet Union added fuel to the internal discussion, 
this time between the communists and the non communists within the APO movement. The non 
communist part of the movement wanted the communist part to actively distance themselves from 
the invasion and the Soviet Union, the communist that were supporting the Soviet Union were not 
prepared to do so. An event that added to the already splitting protest movement.62 
In 1969, Willy Brandt was chosen as the new Bundeskanzler and with that came great 
expectations; in the form of social change and Ostpolitik. It was the first time after the war that 
there was a Bundeskanzler that did not came from the CDU. Under Willy Brandt the GDR would be
acknowledged for the first time by West Germany and Willy Brandt sought contact with the east, 
most famously demonstrated by his visit to Warsaw and the ‘Kniefall’. Although West Germany 
acknowledged the GDR it did not see it as a separate country. This attitude was demonstrated by the
magazine of the SPD called Vorwärts, in which they reported about the GDR under the title 
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Deutschland. The Brandt government lasted until 1974 when Brandt stepped down due to a scandal.
Nevertheless, his government is remembered primarily for the connection to the east. 
With the falling apart of the protest movement from 1968 on, some members that stayed, 
started to radicalize. Instead of mass demonstrations, the protest movement changed to vandalizing 
symbols of capitalism and the psychological terrorizing of conservative judges. This radicalization 
was partly initiated by Hans Jurgen Krahl who, after the shooting of Rudi Dutschke, took the 
leading position within the SDS.63 In the winter of 1968/1968 the first urban guerrilla groups started
to emerge from old APO members and the first bomb attacks were a fact. These bombs, however, 
were supplied by Peter Urbach, an undercover agent for the police.64 It is difficult to give an exact 
date on when these groups transitioned into terrorism but it is clear that it was in the summer of 
1969. The first attack committed by the group was on 9 November 1969, against a Jewish 
community center. An attack that did not only symbolize the radicalization but also the rising 
antizionism and antisemitism in parts of the left movement.65 
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Chapter 2
     The changing discourse within the West German left
movement due to left wing radical violence between 
1970 - 1972
The previous chapter gave an overview of the political history of West Germany and the 
development of the protest movement between 1945 and 1970. It showed how the Allied powers 
influenced the immediate post-war years and how the Cold War influenced the political 
developments in the decades after World War II. Furthermore, it showed how the protest movement 
developed from a one issue protest movement against the atomic bomb into a formidable power in 
the 1960s, to losing most of its appeal again after 1968 when the emergency laws were passed in the
government, causing the movement to breakdown into small groups, symbolized by the K-Gruppen.
Although the left movement of the 1960s and 1970s in West Germany has been studied 
many times, most of these studies describe the movements themselves or their interaction with the 
government, police and the media. The influence of left extremist violence on the discourse within 
the left movement has not been looked at until now. In this chapter I will therefore look at how 
violence from left extremist groups, between 1970 and 1972, mainly embodied by the RAF, 
influenced or even changed the discourse within the left movement. 
The left movement was already heavily stigmatized by the government, police and media, 
but the escape of Baader and the forming of the RAF introduced a new era of even heavier 
consequences. The stigmatization of the left movement in West Germany is interesting since it was 
very broad and diverse and therefore impossible to be seen as one entity. This is exactly what the 
government did and as a consequence many people suffered from the measures taken by the 
government against 'left wing extremism'. The actions of a few as well as the reactions of the police 
had a great impact on the general left movement, it is therefore interesting to look at what the left 
movement itself thought of left extremist violence. As mentioned before, the sources used for this 
research are newspapers from the different parts of the left movement, but before looking at the 
discourse about left extremist violence described in the different sources used for this research, it is 
important to look at the organizations behind the sources. When did they come into existence? Who 
were the people behind the newspapers? Where did they stand within the left movement? What kind
of opinion in general did they represent? These are the questions that will be answered first. 
All of the newspapers used for this research started out as alternative newspapers; parts of 
protest movements in their time of coming to existence. Interestingly it are the two oldest ones, 
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Vorwärts and Konkret, are the only ones that still operate in almost the same capacity as during the 
1970s. The oldest newspaper used for this research is Vorwärts that originated in 1876 as the 
newspaper for the SPD.66  Like most of the newspapers used for this research Vorwärts had to go 
underground several times during its existence. The first time was during the Sozialistengesetz 
between 1878 and 1890, when Bismarck banned all socialist and social democratic organizations 
after an attack on his life. The attack was however not related to socialism or social democracy.67 
After the ending of the Sozialistengesetz in 1890 Vorwärts was republished in 1891 as the 
central body of the SPD. With the rise of national socialism in 1933 Vorwärts was forced to go 
underground again and went in exile in Prague and Paris, from 1940 they went in exile in London.68 
With the German invasion in France, in 1940, the news paper stopped existing until it was 
reestablished on 11 September 1948, under the name  Neue Vorwärts until the name was changed 
back to Vowärts in 1955.69
The political outlook of the magazine has always been to the left. However, during history 
their place within the leftist spectrum has changed. In their early history the SPD, and therefore 
Vorwärts, could be considered far left on the spectrum but after the early 1900s it transformed from 
being socialist to being a social democratic party. After World War I the SPD developed from an 
opposition party into a coalition party standing more left of center than far left.   
Like Vorwärts, Konkret is currently still published in a similar way as in the 1970s.70 The 
magazine was founded in 1957 in Hamburg and like the majority of the newspapers used for this 
research, it started out as a student magazine. The magazine was founded by Klaus Rainer Röhl. As 
a student, Röhl became a member of the KPD in the fall of 1956. The year the KPD was declared a 
hostile organization and it became illegal to be a member of the KPD.71 In the early years the 
magazine was financed by the GDR. Röhl claims in his book that he received the money via the 
illegal KPD but was initially unaware the money came from the GDR. The initial political focus of 
the magazine was to promote the GDR, tackle anti-communism and focus on the reuniting of 
Germany72 Due to the connection with the GDR, according to Röhl, the magazine Konkret and its 
writers had a considerable influence on the political development of the left movement from 1958 
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onwards.73 Out of that movement several students would become authors for the Konkret, for 
instance Ulrike Meinhof, whom Röhl married in 1961.74  
The influence of the GDR lasted until 1964 when, due to conflicts between Röhl and the 
SED about the course of the magazine, the funding from the east stopped.75 One of the reasons for 
the conflicts and why the magazine was able to keep afloat after it lost funding from the SED, was 
due to the more sexual content and photos that were published in the magazine, using the trend of 
the sexual revolution.76 The result of this was, that between 1969 and 1974 every Konkret was 
covered with naked women. Something that was criticized by other left newspapers like the Agit 
883 that referred to the Konkret as  'das deutschen Playboy Magazin' and referring to the article 
about the arrest of Horst Mahler as 'sex-and-crime-Still'. 77 Konkret was mainly popular within the 
more bourgeois and upper middle-class left scene in West Germany.
Agit 883 can be considered an extreme left newspaper and at the opposite side of the left 
spectrum from Vorwärts and Konkret. Konkret and Vorwärts were legal magazines that were highly 
popular among the moderate left and the more political and culturally engaged. Agit 883 was a short
lived underground magazine that can be considered the one magazine that openly sympathized with 
leftist extremist groups like the RAF. The magazine existed from February 1969 until February 
1972 and originated from the APO movement.78 The title of the magazine referred to the last three 
numbers of the telephone number of the Wohngemeinschaft on the Uhlandstraße, West Berlin where
it was first printed, with Agit being short for Agitation.79 The style of the magazine was alternative, 
radical and provoking. 
The magazine became known to the wider public in 1970 when Agit 883 published a protest 
message, written by Ulrike Meinhof, after the escape of Baader. This was the first ever statement 
published by the RAF.80 Since Agit 883 was the main source used by the RAF to publish their 
documents and statements, the police immediately saw the publishers of the magazine as 
sympathizers of a hostile organization. The frequent solidarity pledges with Genossen in prison did 
not help the image of the newspaper. One of these Genossen was Baader before he escaped81 
73 K. R. Röhl, Fünf Finger sind keine Faust, (Köln, 1974) p. 10
74 K. R. Röhl, Fünf Finger sind keine Faust, (Köln, 1974) p. 156
75 K. R. Röhl, Fünf Finger sind keine Faust, (Köln, 1974) p. 182
76 K. R. Röhl, Fünf Finger sind keine Faust, (Köln, 1974) p. 339 - 340
77 FU Berlin, APO, nr 71 Agit 883, 15-11-1970, p. 10
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80  K. Andresen, M. Mohr and H. Rübner, Agit 883. Revolte Underground in Westberlin 1969-1972. (Hamburg/Berlin, 
2007) p. 136-137
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2007) p. 255-268
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The editors of Agit 883 changed five times due to internal discussions, which created some 
radical direction shifts, sometimes supporting the RAF and sometimes distancing themselves from 
it.82 It is hard to find out who the writers were. At the beginning of Agit 883, the editorial meetings 
were open for everybody, in other cases articles would be anonymous due to the consequences in 
the form of fines or prison. In the mainstream media Agit 883 is often referred to as a breathing 
ground for terrorists due to the fact that several writers and collaborators of the magazine joined left
extremist groups like the RAF or Bewegung 2 Juni, the most famous of whom was Holger Meins.  
The organizations behind the three other newspapers  used for this research are all known as 
K-gruppen. The K-gruppen or Kommunistische kleinparteien, emerged from the APO and SDS, 
which collapsed in 1969. Something that was already characteristic of the APO but even more for 
the period after that, was the ongoing discussion within the left movement about what the correct 
kind of 'left' was. So much so that this would take up most of the discourse within and between the 
different groups.83 The following newspapers of the K-Gruppen were used for this research: 
Kommunistische Partei Deutschland Aufbau Organisation (KPD A/O) with the Rote Fahne, 
Kommunistische partei Deutschland Marxisten/Leninisten (KPD M/L) with the Roter Morgen and 
the Kommunistischen Studentenverband (KSV) with the Rote Presse Korrespondenze. Since all of 
the newspapers belonged to the K-Gruppen, they have a shared history and similar ideologies. It is 
important to note that although  they look similar to an outsider, they did have differences that were 
important for their members. The key factor in this was on what theory or form of socialism or 
communism they based their ideology on such as the Marxist, Leninist, Trotskyist, Stalinist or 
Chinese form of socialism/communism. Furthermore, the Roter Morgen expressed more radical 
point of views than the Rote Fahne or the Rote Presse Korrespondenze.
Many of the changes happening within the left movement during that time were a continuing
process, but they seemed to be concentrated around the escape of Andreas Baader on 14 May 1970. 
Andreas Baader, who was sentenced to jail for the warehouse fires in Frankfurt in 1968, managed to
escape due to a scheme set up by his lover Gudrun Enslin and Konkret journalist Ulrike Meinhof. 
Under the pretense of an interview between Meinhof and Baader, on his work with orphans, Baader 
was moved to the 'Deutsche zentral institut für soziale Fragen' in Berlin, where he, with the help of 
Enslin, Meinhof and three others, managed to escape. The escape was a success but did not go 
according to plan. Nobody was supposed to get wounded, but during the event an employee of the 
institute and a police officer got shot. Meinhof, who was supposed to stay behind to not be 
associated with the group in order to be able to report on it later,  driven by panic jumped out of the 
82 K. Andresen, M. Mohr and H. Rübner, Agit 883. Revolte Underground in Westberlin 1969-1972. (Hamburg/Berlin, 
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window. She went on to become one of the most wanted people in West Germany at that time. 
The different responses to the escape of Baader within the left movement, in the form 
newspaper articles, immediately showed the different positions within the social landscape. The 
strong clashes between the left movement and the police and authorities furthermore complicated 
the way certain groups could react. The K-Gruppen openly identified themselves as communists 
meaning they did not only have to react to the escape itself, but also to the allegations made against 
them. They were therefore quick to distance themselves from the escape and declared that the act 
had nothing to do with communism and socialism. 
The Rote Presse Korrespondenz and the Rote Fahne reacted in a similar way with the most 
elaborate article in the Rote Fahne. The essence of the article was that an 'individual' action like this
is only damaging to the cause of communism. Furthermore, it seems that the writer of the article 
tried to separate the escape from socialism in general, probably to secure their own position. 'Die 
Befreiungsaktion vom Donnerstag war die Tat einer Gruppe, die weder am Kampf um die 
sozialistische Organisation beteiligt ist, noch überhaupt den Anspruch erhebt, als ein Kreis von 
Sozialisten angesehen zu werden. Deshalb trägt diese Aktion in unseren Augen privaten Charakter. 
Die näheren Umstände der Befreiung weisen an sich schon darauf hin, daß die Befreier 
sozialistischen Organisations- und Aktions formen fremd und ablehnend gegenüberstehen.'84 In the 
article the writers express the fear that, like before, the government could use this individual act to 
blame the left for causing terror and therefore have a legitimate reason to control and oppress the 
left even more. 
The article is somewhat ambiguous on the topic of violence itself. In their articles some 
groups within the left movement regularly used aggressive language when writing about the 
international and national protests. They often referred to the classic socialist ideology in which the 
workers unite and violently overthrow the government and oppressing class. With actual violence 
coming from a group that identified themselves as left, the discussion about violence became more 
than just theoretical. Besides this reference to violence, they often supported violent actions in other
countries.
Being faced with heavy violence from within the left movement, the K-Gruppen were put in 
an ambiguous position. By distancing themselves from the violent escape, they would hurt their 
own cause, but by not doing so they would attract even more negative attention from the authorities 
and therefore put themselves at risk of being banned by the government. Therefore they declared 
the act of the escape as a individual action and did not denounce violence as a whole. 'Kommunisten
lehnen Gewaltanwendung weder grundsätzlich ab, noch stimmen sie ihr grundsätzlich zu. Ihre 
84 FU Berlin, APO, nr 3 Rote Fahne, May 1970, p. 3
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Kampf- und Aktionsformen stützen sich auf die genaue Beurteilung der Lage der Klassen: der 
Stärke des Feindes – des Kapitals und seines Staates – sowohl wie der Stärke der eigenen Reihen.'85
The article even goes a step further, stating that every communist party would support the rescue or 
escape of a ‘comrade’ from jail. Initially this sounds like they supported the escape of Baader, but 
since they separated the Baader escape from socialism and communism, it did not apply to the 
escape. With this careful construction of the text they could keep their radical view without actually 
supporting the escape. 
The first response of Agit 883 to the escape came on 22 May 1970. Their response is 
interesting for several reasons. First of all they published the first message of the RAF after the 
Baader escape. Secondly they criticized the other left media for distancing themselves from the 
escape, pointing to the problematic point of view on violence within parts of the left movement. 
‘Wenn in den USA die Schwarzen in den Ghettos die Kaufhäuser in Brand stecken, solidarisieren 
wir uns, und begreifen dies als das richtige Handeln. Wenn in den USA Bobby Seale befreit würde, 
würden wir ein Glückwunschtelegram schicken, auch wenn dabei drei pigs hätten daran glauben 
müssen. Ein Genosse ist befreit worden. Was ist die Haltung der Genossen zur Befreiung? Die 
hauptsächliche Seite dieser Befreiung, interessiert sie weniger, als die Art und Weise. Die Genossen 
wollen sich distanzieren, ihre Methoden und Argumentationen sind verschieden, immer aber 
wohlbegründet, strategisch durchdacht und leidenschaftslos.'86 An evaluation that effectively 
stipulates the ambiguous relationship with violence in the left movement, in particular that of the K-
Gruppen.87 This was the only left newspaper that supported the escape.
To the outside world, the opinion of Agit 883 was controversial, but the talks of the escape 
and the RAF were a cause for controversy among the members of Agit 883. On 5 June 1970, Agit 
883 published a second letter they received from the RAF, the text that is considered the founding 
text of the RAF. ‘Die Rote Armee Aufbauen’88 What is striking is that in the upper corner of the 
page the article was printed on, there was a small disclaimer. Instead of pairing the article with their 
strong opinions, as would be expected, the text just says 'Dieser Text wurde der 883-Redaktion 
zugeschickt. Wir dokumentieren ihn in dieser Ausgabe ohne Kommentar, um der Diskussion über 
die praktischen Schritte zum Aufbau der RA nicht vorzugreifen. In der nächsten Nummer drucken 
Stellungnahmen zu den Brief. Gleichzeitig fordern wir die Genossen und Gruppen auf an der 
85 FU Berlin, APO, nr 3, Rote Fahne, Mai 1970, p. 3
86 FU Berlin, APO, nr 61 Agit 883, 22 Mai 1970, p. 3
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88 FU Berlin, APO, nr 62 Agit 883, 5 June1970, p. 6
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Diskussion teilzunehmen.'89 This message is likely to have come forward from a discussion and a 
disagreement over the text itself. The editorial break occurred between the publishing of this issue 
and the next issue, implying that the publishing of the text caused the internal break. This 
demonstrated that even within the extreme left there was no consent on whether to unconditionally 
support the group or not.
Due to their position within the left movement the aforementioned newspapers had in 
common that they were immediately stigmatized after the escape of Baader. This was less the case 
for Konkret and Vorwärts since they were considered more moderate left newspapers and therefore 
were not associated with violence. Vorwärts only addressed the escape shortly on 28 May. Although
Vorwärts was published on a weekly basis, it took them some time to mention the escape. This can 
be explained by the fact that in the same week as the escape there was also the SPD party 
conference, and Vorwärts dedicated a full issue to that subject. 
In their article on 28 May 1970, they gave a short analysis about who benefited most from 
the actions and came up with a somewhat surprising but suited answer for a political newspaper that
is linked to a political party. The article points to the CDU and the anarchist wing of the West Berlin
APO as benefiting parties. ‘Den Berliner Christendemokraten verschaffte die Baader-Befreiung 
wilkommene Munition für den Wahlkampf. … Die Diskussion zwischen den 
außerparlamentarischen Flügeln Berlins werder indes mit fast noch größerer Erbitterung als die 
der innerparlamentarischen Fraktionen.’90  
The analysis they give is interesting because it does not only explain the situation, but it also
says a lot about the newspaper itself. The CDU was in the opposition in the Bundestag and the SPD 
would therefore be very likely to use everything they could to discredit the CDU. In the weeks 
leading up to this article the CDU was mentioned several times in articles about the ‘right to 
demonstrate’, something the CDU wanted to restrict. The anarchist wing of the old APO and the  
SPD were also each others political opponents, and just like with the CDU, it would not hurt the 
SPD to politically disqualify this part of the left movement. The SPD was, after all, in the 
government in the 1960s, passed the emergency laws in 1968 and had to deal with protests from the 
APO.
Konkret took until 4 June 1970, before reacting on the escape, but with a different analysis 
than the other newspapers. In this issue, they directly published four different articles about the 
escape. The first and possibly most interesting article was by Klaus Rainer Röhl, the editor of the 
magazine and ex-husband of Meinhof. In the article entitled 'Anarchismus führt zum Fashismus' he 
89 FU Berlin, APO, nr 62 Agit 883, 5 June1970, p. 6
90 FU Berlin, APO, nr 22 Vorwärts, 28 May1970, p. 7
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heavily criticizes the escape and states that the left should finally draw a line between themselves 
and the enemies of socialism; ‘ Alle Linken aber, alle, die die Veränderung unserer Gesellschaft 
ernstnehmen, vom Kommunistischen Lehrling bis zum marxistischen Universitätsdozenten, müssen 
jetzt, endlich, einen Schlußstrich ziehen zwischen den Sozialisten und den Feinden des Sozialismus. 
Schluß mit diesen”Genossen”.’91 
In the article he criticized the group, explaining, like many other newspapers did, that this 
was not helping the left, but helping the opponents of the left. The two main opponents he 
mentioned were Hans Jozef Strauß, the party leader of the CSU, who was a strong opposer of Willy 
Brandt, and Axel Springer, the leader of the Axel Springer group, with populist newspapers like 
Bild-Zeitung. ‘Es sind nicht unsere Genossen, sondern die Hilfstruppen von Strauß und Springer, 
die Feinde der Arbeiterklasse und des Sozialismus. Handeln wir nach ihrem eigenen Motto: Macht 
kaputt, was euch kaputt macht. Macht den Anarchismus kaputt.’ 92 
The critic of the magazine continued in a second article, written by Peter Hahn and Claus 
Fried, who wrote an article called 'Die Bombenleger von Berlin. Mit den Schüssen, durch die am 
14. Mai in Berlin der Kaufheusbrandstifter Andreas Baader “befreit” wurde, erreichten die 
Aktionen terroristischer Anarchistengruppen ihren vorläufigen Höhepunkt. Wie es zu einer 
Situation kommen konnte, inder Terroristen der Polizei beim Kampf gegen die Linke Schützenhilfe 
leisten, schildert der folgende Bericht von Peter Hahn und Claus Fried.’93 The title of the article is 
very clear, stating that the escape only aids the police in their fight against the left movement, an 
opinion that is later also expressed by the K-gruppen. It shows that the Konkret, as well as Vorwärts,
had a different and more negative opinion about the escape than the other left newspapers. 
Something else that stands out in this title is that it shows how, unlike other left magazines, Konkret 
already referred to the group as a terrorist group less than a month after the Baader escape.  
The third article, written by Claus Fried under the title 'Neubauers nützliche Idioten.' 
focused on the fact that Ulrike’s picture was on all the 'wanted' posters instead of Baader; the one 
that actually escaped.94 Fried goes even further by stating that it is not even clear whether Ulrike 
Meinhof was involved. '10 000 DM Belohnung verheißt ein Berliner Plakat auf allen 
Anschlagsäulen dem, der die Festnahme Ulrike Marie Meinhof ermöglicht. Sie, die Publizistin, 
deren Rolle in diesem Vorfall vorläufig noch einigermaßen unklar ist, und nicht Baader selbst, ziert 
einen in 2000 Exemplaren aufgelegten Steckbrief, den ersten Berlins seit 1945.'95 This is the only 
article that is initially critical of the possible role of Ulrike Meinhof and the reaction of the police of
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putting her face instead of Baaders, on all the wanted posters instead of Baaders. As with the article 
in Vorwärts, this tells something about the newspaper itself. It seems logical that the magazine, that 
had Ulrike Meinhof as star journalist, wrote critically about her role and did not want to see her as a
possible accomplice, until one could be certain. 
The articles published in Konkret as a response to the Baader escape paint a very clear 
picture of their general opinion and feelings. Like most of the other left newspapers they distanced 
themselves from the escape and described how they believed it would only help the police. 
Continuing on the same line as the Rote Presse Korrespondenze, Konkret also disconnected the 
RAF from the left and refers to the RAF as enemies of the left. What is unique for Konkret, 
however, is the connection and response on the ‘possible’ involvement of Ulrike Meinhof.
The fourth and final article under the title ‘Wem nützt Anarchismus? Konkret Umfrage bei 
bundesdetuschen Linken zum Fall Baader’, was, as the title suggests, based on interviews with 
figures from the left movement in West Germany. The responses in the interviews are comparable 
with the responses of for  instance the K-Gruppen. Like the majority of the responses the 
interviewed people saw the actions of the group as not helping the left and even as destroying the 
left movement. 'Mit solchen objectiven und subjektiven Handlangern der Reaktion, die jede 
Solidarität der arbeitenden Massen zunichtemachen, können wir nicht solidarisch sein.' (Wolfgang 
Gehrke, Bundesvorstand der SDAJ).96 
The Republikeinse Hilfe had a slightly different view on the matter that was relatively bold, 
knowing how the police reacted on possible 'sympathizers' 'Für die antirevisionistische Linke 
besteht kein Anlaβ, die bürgerliche Kritik an der Befreiungsaktion zu übernehmen. Wir können nur 
offen erklären, daβ wir nie in unserem Kampf auf Gewalt verzichtet haben oder werden. Legitime 
Gewalt aber ist für uns immer nur Mittel des revolutionäre Kampfes, sie ist strategisch 
gerechtfertigt durch die militärische und ökonomische Stärke der Diktatur der Bourgeoisie.' 
Republikeinse Hilfe, Frankfurt.97 This statement, as did the statements of the K-Gruppen before, 
shows that although the Republikeinse Hilfe distanced themselves from the escape, they do not 
oppose violence. 
The reactions within the left movement to the escape of Baader and the forming of a new 
group that openly aimed to fight the government and social injustice with violence, differed greatly. 
The moderate left and the social democrats responded with great disapproval while presenting their 
own analysis of the events. Vorwärts published a short article on page 7 of the newspaper, using it 
to discredit political opponents. Konkret responded with lengthly articles in an effort to understand 
96 FU Berlin, APO, nr 12 Konkret, 4 June 1970, p. 53
97 FU Berlin, APO, nr 12 Konkret, 4 June 1970, p. 53 - 54
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the event and most of all, the role of Ulrike Meinhof. The K-Gruppen were pushed into a corner due
to the simplified image of 'communist violence' given by the mainstream media and not wanting to 
denounce violence all together. The somewhat difficult reactions of the K-Gruppen on the escape 
were furthermore paired with complex Marxist texts that were often very long. The Agit 883 was 
responsible for publishing the RAF texts and was the only left newspaper that openly supported the 
escape. It also caused for an internal discussion that eventually led to the second break of Agit 883. 
Some of the more radical people in Agit 883, like Holger Meins, would later on join the RAF. 
The escape of Baader was the most spectacular and high profile case of left wing violence in
1970. It would be the main event to be referred to within the left discourse on left extremist 
violence in 1970. The reason for this was that fast after the escape the members of the RAF went to 
the Middle East for Guerrilla training. After their return they kept a low profile. The bank robberies,
committed by the RAF on 29 September 1970, also did not lead to any response from the left 
movement. The exact reason for that is unclear, but it is likely that because it did not cause physical 
injuries and was a logical step for a group that had to go underground. Besides a few more articles 
about the RAF, the topic of left radical violence was not discussed in the left newspapers.
The K-Gruppen stayed focused on the discussion about Communism and would mainly 
report on the international fight against capitalism and imperialism. The banning of the 
Heidelberger SDS in July 1970 and the possible banning of the Rote Zellen in November 1970 for 
being a danger to the democracy, caused the K-Gruppen to pledge their solidarity to the two groups.
These  articles, however, mainly described actions taken by the authorities against the left, 
something that will return in the next chapter. 
The Roter Morgen published an article, on 8 September 1970, about 'Die neuen Terroristen. 
Ökonomismus und Terrorismus'. In this article they give a very indepth analyses of the 'new 
terrorists', referring to the Baader-Meinhof group as the 'new terrorists'. This article is interesting 
because of the way in which they referred to the RAF as terrorists, without doing so directly. Only 
in the last part they mention Baader. Throughout the rest of the article they just mention the ‘new 
terrorists’, this indicates that the writers expected it to be clear for the majority of their readers; that 
they were referring to the group without even mentioning them from the start. That shows the 
impact the Baader escape and the RAF had at least on some parts of the left movement. 
This article also shows how they managed to link everything to the class struggle:  'Der 
Terrorismus ist sozusagen die höchste Form des blinden antikapitalistischen Protestes des 
Kleinbürgertums. So wie die ihm eigene Produktionsweise das Kleinbürgertum zersplittert, ist auch 
sein Kampf nicht der organisierte, disziplinierte Kampf einer Klasse (wie der des Proletariats), 
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sondern die hilflose Aktion von Einzelnen.’98 This sentence shows very clearly how they linked 
terrorism to the class struggle, by using elements of the classic socialist ideology such as ‘the 
organized fight’ and referring to the acts of the group as ‘non unified or organized’ and therefore did
not help the class struggle. In the same article they even blame the group from putting individualism
before the communal good, a faux pas within socialism and communism. ‘Aus dieser Not nun 
machen die Terroristen auch noch eine Tugend: im spontanen und isolierten Kampf sehen sie die 
Individualität  gesichert, die ihnen so teuer ist. Denn das Beharren auf dem Individualismus, die 
Ablehnung jeden ''Zwangs'' heißt ja nur: Beharren auf den kleinbürgerlichen Privilegien.'99 
It is the first newspaper of the K-Gruppen to refer to the group as terrorists. Even though the 
article is about terrorism it actually does not talk about violence in the  traditional sense. They apply
communist theories on why people do what they do and how this differs from, for instance, what 
would be the best for the masses. This is clear by the fact that they refer to the actions of the group 
as being bourgeois and used it to keep their bourgeois individuality instead of fighting for the 
common good. 
In the remainder of 1970, both Vorwärts and Konkret did not dedicate a high number of 
articles to left extremist violence. Konkret would publish a total of four more articles that were more
or less connected to the use of violence and the radicalization of the left movement. The most 
outspoken of these is the article with the title; 'Ulrikes Rote Armee', written by Günter Wallraff, 
published on 2 July 1970.100 In line with the previous articles, it heavily criticizes the 'Baader-
Meinhof-Group', this time including Ulrike Meinhof as part of the group, since at that point it 
became clear that she was, indeed, a part of the group. Like the article in the Roter Morgen this 
article also focuses on the individualistic position of the group,  based on a taped manifesto by 
Ulrike Meinhof that was sent to ‘Der Spiegel’. 
The fact that they sent it to this newspaper was criticized since this newspaper, according to 
Konkret, depended on big industries. ‘Obwohl dieser Rechtfertigungsversuch der gewaltsamen 
Baader-Befreiung stark gefühlsbetont und elitär  individualistisch nach dem Motto “das Volk bin 
ich” ausfällt und sich von der gesamten Linken bewuβt absetzt und isoliert, scheint eine 
Auseinandersetzung dennoch angebracht. Die revolutionäre Ungeduld, die Ulrike Meinhof an den 
Tag liegt, zeigt, welchen Stellenwert sie sich selbst gibt. Nach dem Motto “Wo ich arbeite, ist das 
Zentrum des Klassenkampfes”, verfällt sie (die immerhin lange anonyme Kleinarbeit mit 
Fürsorgezöglingen geleistet hat) in kleinbürgerliches Revoluzzertum............Eins bleibt 
98 FU Berlin, APO, nr 8 Roter Morgen, September 1970, p. 7
99 FU Berlin, APO, nr 8 Roter Morgen, September 1970, p. 7
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festzustellen: Die Aktion wird von fast allen linken Gruppen verurteilt.’101 The article focuses not 
only on the individualistic nature of the groups actions, but also interprets the manifesto as an 
arrogant way of putting themselves center stage in the class struggle. 
Another interesting element in the article is the blame that they put on Ulrike Meinhof. The 
article presents the Manifesto as belonging to Meinhof and that it is Meinhof that is putting the 
group center stage. Although she is the person that communicates with the outer world, it is 
questionable whether this was just her idea or if other people in the group influenced the messages 
too. The article ends with a somewhat ironic sentence, where they refer to a person from the right 
wing scene praising the group for the escape. ‘Eine einzige positive Bemerkung bekam ich bisher 
darüber zu hören: Eins muβ man euch lassen, ihr haltet zusammen, einen Kameraden im Stich 
lassen tut ihr nicht, und schieβen könnt ihr auch. Der mir das sagte, war NPD-Mann.’102 
The other articles in Konkret were more in the sensational category of 'sex and crime', as 
described by Agit 883. On 13 August 1970, they wrote about Dieter Kunzelmann, who was arrested 
on  19 July 1970. Kunzelmann made a name for himself in the '68 movement. Kunzelmann joined 
the APO and SDS and later the Kommune I where he radicalized and commited bomb attacks in 
West Berlin, which he learned in Amman. In the article the writers describes the path of 
Kunzelmann from ‘Kommune clown’ to bomb builder. The article gives a good analysis of the 
general radicalization of the protest movement, from the late 1960s to the early 1970s.103 
The other two articles that were published in October of that year were about Holger Meins 
and Horst Mahler. In the first article, written on 8 October 1970, the writer mainly wrote about the 
inability of the police to make arrests for the fire and bomb attacks between June and September of 
that year. The one person that was arrested was Holger Meins who spent a month in jail pending the
results of the investigation. An interesting fact is that in the time the article was written, Holger 
Meins had just joined the RAF. This shows how fast developments were going at the time and how 
people and groups became linked during the process.104 On 22 October 1970, Konkret published an 
article about the arrest of Horst Mahler, Ingrid Schubert and Irene Goergens. Besides the description
of Mahlers development from lawyer to criminal, the article did not really add much to the 
discussion within the left itself since they were more focused on sensationalism and giving the 
article their typical ‘sex and crime’ style.105 
It seems that after the initial shock of Ulrike Meinhof being a part of the RAF and the 
disapproval of the escape, Konkret was able to focus on their normal way of writing again. Using 
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extraordinary people and sex to make the magazine more attractive for a larger target group. 
Vorwärts might be the hardest to assess since they only published one more article about the 
group and left violence in general. The article with the following title: ‘Fluchthilfe in Nah-Ost. 
Baader Befreier bei arabischen Guerillas untergeschlüpft.’,  describes the escape of the group to the
Middle East and the connection of Mahler to the group. Something that was confirmed due to his 
escape.106 The article even tries to defend Mahler in a certain way and describes the surprised 
reactions to the escape from his colleagues. The article itself has a problem with whether it 
represents the opinion of the newspaper and its readers, because it is written in a recurring column 
of the newspaper where prominent people can write an article. They write that this does not always 
represent the opinion of the people behind the newspaper. In this case it is likely that it does fit in 
with the ideology of the newspaper since the author wrote for the newspaper more often. 
Another way to get a picture of how the social democrats thought about left extremist 
violence, is by looking at articles about foreign protest movements, for instance about the student 
movement in the USA and the Black Panther movement. All of the other newspapers are supportive 
of the movements in the USA, even if these used violence and weapons. Vorwärts, on the other 
hand, to some extend supported the student protest movement of the USA but is, for instance, 
critical towards Angela Davis. Not because they do not agree with their ideas but due to the fact that
weapons were supposedly found in her house. ‘Sie mag zum Symbol geworden sein. Aber angeklagt
ist nicht die Protagonistin einer radikalen Philosophie, sondern eine Frau, deren Waffen an einer 
Stelle gefunden wurden, wo ein Mord begangen worden ist.’107 The social democrats were therefore 
not against the fact that she was on trial, an isolated position within the left movement in West 
Germany. Based on this difference in how they perceived foreign news on protests and violence 
compared to the other sources used for this research, it is likely that their general opinion about the 
student protest movement in West Germany was also more negative than the others. 
As mentioned before, Agit 883 was plagued by internal struggles among others due to the 
discourse on the Baader-Meinhof group. Throughout its existence, Agit 883 would have four big 
struggles that led to reorganization.  The first break already occurred in 1969, the second one in 
June 1970 during the peak  of the discussion on the Baader escape. The signs of an upcoming break 
were already visible in the last publication before the break. Normally a text such as ‘Die Rote 
Armee Aufbauen' would ask for an immediate reaction, but they published it without commenting 
on it, stating that they would do that in the next publication. For a newspaper that is otherwise very 
provoking and fast with stating its opinions, this is striking. 
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The break is clearly visible in the 18 June 1970 issue, since the newspaper is even more 
provoking than before, and now states a very clear opinion on the escape. One of the new people to 
join was Holger Meins. In the second half of 1970 the newspaper fully supported the actions of the 
group and condemned the opinions of other left wing groups. 'Bei der Befreiung des Genossen 
Baader haben Genossen unter Einsatz ihres Lebens, eine Gefangenen aus den Händen der Polizei 
befreit. Sie haben dies in einer gut geplanten und in allen Einzelheiten richtig durchgeführten 
Aktion getan. Und nun kamen die Noch-nicht-Revolutionäre, und sagten, das sei ein privates 
Unternehmen gewesen. Und zwar jene die nichts dagegen hatten, nach Moabit zu marschieren und 
die Scheiben des Gefängnisses einzuwerfen und den Gefangenen 'Solidarität' zu versprechen.’108 
Over the next few months Agit 883 became an active promoter of violence until the break in early 
1971, when the most radical people, like Holger Meins, went underground to join the RAF. 
The transformation of members of the student protest movement into terrorists is 
symbolized by the attacks in May 1972 and reached another peak during the ‘Deutsche Herbst’ in 
1977. Compared to these outbursts of violence in the form of bomb attacks, kidnappings and 
murders, the first two years were relatively mild. 1970 was mostly symbolized by the escape of 
Baader. After that it was the publishing of their first statement, the three bank-robberies on 29 
September and the arrest of Mahler, Schubert and Goergens that symbolized the first year of the 
RAF. Although the amount of acts on a large scale were not that high, the rumors about possible 
RAF targets and acts were. These rumors were partly fueled by the police reactions towards the 
general left movement, that increased considerably after the escape of Baader. This was symbolized 
by the fact that the RAF was named state enemy number one on 13 February 1971. This influenced 
the discourse within the left movement greatly. How this influenced the left discourse will be 
explained in chapter three. In the following part, the change of the discourse within the left 
movement by left radical violence in 1971 will be explained.
The bank-robberies committed by the RAF seemed either not interesting enough for the 
newspapers included in this research to write about, or it was difficult for the journalists to write 
about them. On 29 September 1970, and on 15 January 1971, three robberies were committed on 
the same day by the RAF.109 Since the RAF had to go underground it is highly likely they 
committed the robberies to support themselves. The reasons for the robberies therefore seem fairly 
practical in order to support their ideology. It is possible that the robberies just were not interesting 
enough for the newspapers to talk about. The robberies themselves were not ideological and for the 
more extreme left newspapers, that oppose capitalism, they might even have supported the 
108 FU Berlin, APO, nr 63 Agit 883 18 June 1970,  p. 4 - 5
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robberies. If the K-Gruppen, for instance, supported the robberies, this could also have been the 
reason for them to not write about it. Papers by the K-Gruppen and Agit 883 in particular were 
under a constant threat from the authorities. Supporting bank-robberies could be the final straw for 
the authorities to ban the newspapers. It is therefore also possible that it was a safe decision not to 
write about it. For Konkret the robberies were probably not interesting enough to write about since 
the magazine tended to have longer articles that acquired longer research.
In February it became clear that the actions of the RAF were causing friction within the left 
movement. As mentioned before, the left movement of the 1970s was highly divided and especially 
within the more extreme left this often led to discussions. In February 1971, there were allegations 
from the Agit 883 towards the Rote Presse Korrespondenze and the Rote Hilfe. The Rote Hilfe was 
an initiative to support people that, according to them, were political prisoners or prosecuted for 
political reasons. The support that existed was often financial help or providing a lawyer. They 
would often publish support pamphlets in the newspapers by the K-Gruppen. 
In many of these support pamphlets they would name specific people that were in prison at 
that point. The members of the RAF like Mahler, Goergens and Schubert, who were already 
arrested by October 1970, did not appear on these pamphlets, causing the Agit 883 to blame the 
Rote Hilfe of not supporting all the political prisoners. In a response that was published in the Rote 
Presse Korrespondenze, the Rote Hilfe explains that, although they do not support all actions, they 
do support all political prisoners.
This conflict was around the same time as when the government declared the RAF state 
enemy number one, on 13 February 1971.110 Whether this response of the Rote Hilfe was a direct 
reaction to the actions of the government is not fully clear but it is highly likely that the discourse 
was affected by left extremist violence and therefore also this response. In the next chapter, 
however, I will show how in relation to the actions of the radical left, the actions of the authorities 
also had a high influence on the discourse within the left movement, maybe even higher than the 
actions of the radical left itself. 
Besides this conflict between the Rote Hilfe and Agit 883 the left movement did not respond 
to actions committed by the radical left. On 11 May 1971, Agit 883 published ‘Das Konzept 
Stadtguerilla’ by the RAF. Besides the bank-robbery in January of that year and the RAF members 
that were already in prison, this was the first publication made by the RAF in 1971. The publication 
of the document seems interesting enough for other newspapers of the left movement, other than the
Agit 883, to react to. This, however, did not happen. The shooting of Petra Schelm on 15 July 1971, 
110 B. de Graaf, Theater van de angst. De strijd tegen terrorisme in Nederland, Duitsland, Italie en Amerika. 
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37
the bank-robbery on 22 October 1971, where a police officer was killed, and the shooting of Georg 
von Rauch on 2 December 1971, also did not cause a debate within the left movement about 
violence by the radical left.
 The lack of response to these events by the left movement can have several causes. It is 
possible that due to the high profile the RAF initially had and the discussions held the previous year
about left radical violence, the topic was not as interesting anymore. The main ideas and goals of 
the RAF were clear and they did not present fundamental new ideas or commit remarkable new 
actions. 1971 was therefore also more symbolized by the new police actions and court cases than 
actual actions from the radical left. The left movement did write a lot about the reaction of the 
authorities and the police. This, as mentioned before, will be discussed in the following chapter. A 
final reason that might have influenced the lack of debate around violence from the radical left 
could be the fear of legal consequences now that the RAF was state enemy number one; a fear that 
fits very well with the actions of police and authorities and will therefore also be discussed in the 
next chapter.
Looking at 1970 and 1971 it becomes clear that the left media initially struggled with how to
react to left wing radical violence. Most of the groups ended up distancing themselves from the 
escape of Baader. In 1971 on the other hand the discussion about violence used by left radicals lost 
coverage and the newspapers mainly wrote about the reaction of the police. This, however, changed 
in 1972. Radical violence from within the left wing movement reached a climax in May 1972, when
the RAF committed several bomb attacks, with injuries and deaths as a consequence. The left 
newspapers were reporting on left wing radicalism, embodied by the RAF on a regular basis until 
July 1972.
In 1971, Konkret kept silent on the topic of left radical violence until the death of Georg von 
Rauch in December. In 1972 Konkret, opposed to the previous year, wrote a number of articles 
about the RAF and left radical violence. The first article that was published in Konkret was not an 
article by themselves but from Horizont, an East German magazine.111 This might be because at that
point left radical violence was relatively low; it were more the police and government that initiated 
situations such as the mass searches, which resulted in the death of Petra Schelm and Georg von 
Rauch. It is therefore possible that Konkret decided to publish an article that in principal gave an 
opinion that was the same as their own, but was new because it was an article from the East 
Germany. It is interesting that Konkret published an article from an East German newspaper 
because of their own history with East Germany. In the first chapter it was mentioned that until 
1964, Konkret received financial support from East Germany. Whether the publishing of this article 
111 FU Berlin, APO, nr 3 Konkret, 27 January 1972, p. 14 - 15
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was related to former contacts between Konkret and East Germany or just connected to the search 
for publishing interesting content is not clear. 
The opinion depicted in the Horizont article perfectly fitted within the opinions given by the 
left movement in West Germany in general, including  that of Konkret. Like the left movement in 
West Germany did before, the article from Horizont analyzed the actions of the RAF and concluded 
that these actions did not fit in the left ideology. The article concludes that the RAF is therefore a 
right wing group instead of a left wing group. Stereotyping the RAF and their form of violence as 
right wing was a trend that was followed by the left movement in West Germany after the attacks in 
May 1972. 
In February 1972, after a long period of silence, the RAF communicated with the outer 
world via a letter that was send to the media. The letter included a fingerprint of Baader to prove the
authenticity of the letter. Although the letter was not a form of physical violence, it was provoking. 
It would therefore be expected that the different newspapers would respond to it. Interestingly only 
two newspapers did: Konkret and Rote Fahne. 
The thumb print letter was the inspiration for Konkret to publish a three part analysis about 
the RAF. The title of the article gives a good summary of how parts of the left movement perceived 
the RAF; ‘B&M Die Analyse der Gruppe. Die Zeit läuft ab, denn die Wahlen rücken näher. 
Genscher und Konsorten haben der Baader-Meinhof-Gruppe 21 Monate lang Auslauf gewährt. 
B&M wurde Markenartikel der Reaktion und Stiftete ideologische Verwirrung unter Linken. Zur 
Klärung die KONKRET-Serie.’ 112 The article itself is written in the typical style of Konkret, it reads 
like an exciting book that sometimes comes close to creating a parody out of the RAF. The article 
mainly criticizes the group itself for being elitist and having lost the connection with the left 
movement. ‘Von nun an hieβ es nicht mehr die Welt verändern, sondern sich selbst verändern. 
Perücken und Haarfärbemittel, schnelle Automobile und elegante Kleidung konnten auf diese Weise
ihres verhaβten Warencharakters entkleidt und als einfache Gebrauchswerte in den Dienst der 
proletarischen Revolution gestellt werden.'113 
It is interesting that, although they gave an indepth analysis of the RAF, the discussion about
violence seems to have got lost completely. The articles mainly focus on the intrigues around the 
group. They criticize that, according to their opinion, the RAF did not care about the fate of the 
‘proletariat’. They believed this because the members that were already incarcerated did not have a 
higher education and came from lower society; the ones for whom it is harder to adapt. The main 
members however, besides Mahler, where still free. The article criticized that these people, the 
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actual proletariat, were not assisted to break out of prison.
The only other left newspaper to write about the group in February 1972, and in the 
beginning of that year in general, is the Rote Fahne. In their article, likewise a reaction to the 
thumb-printed letter of Baader, the Rote Fahne also clearly distanced themselves from the actions of
the RAF.114 It is likely that the debate on violence influenced the Rote Fahne, because their tone on 
violence seemed to have changed. In their article they wrote that the RAF did not have any support 
among the communists in West Germany. They even advocate that the RAF should dissolve itself. 
The more moderate opinion on violence becomes clear when they write that the communists should 
focus on creating political parties and focus on legal ways to promote their ideas. The subject of 
armed revolution and that in history there has not been a peaceful transition to a socialist society 
were not mentioned at all; something they did before. This shows that the Rote Fahne must have 
altered their opinions on violence or at least altered their strategy in order to function in the society 
without running the risk of being banned by the government. 
The violence of the radical left, symbolized by the RAF, between 1970 and 1972 was mainly
in the form of words and bank robberies. This lasted until May 1972, when the RAF committed 
several bomb attacks in the time frame of one month. The targets included American military bases 
in West Germany, buildings of the Springer concern and judges. Besides the massive material 
damages, dozens of people got seriously wounded and four people died.115 The search for the RAF, 
which was already strong in early 1972, now got even more precedence. With this amount of 
violence it was impossible for the left newspapers to ignore the violence shown by left radical 
groups like the RAF. It does seem that the different newspapers needed time to respond to the 
attacks because, in May only Konkret, Vorwärts and Rote Fahne wrote about the attacks. These 
responses came at the end of May. For the other newspapers it would take until the arrest of the 
main characters of the RAF before they responded to the attacks. 
In the beginning of 1972, Vorwärts was absent from the discussion about left radical 
violence. This changed at the end of May with the attacks committed by the RAF. On 25 May 1972,
they responded to the attacks with the following article; ‘Bürger zwischen Banden und Bomben. 
Kein Pardon für Gewalttäter.’ The article clearly denounced the violence and explains that the wars 
in Asia and imperialism were not enough motivation for people to commit such acts. 
The way the article refers to the RAF is interesting because, besides distancing themselves 
from the RAF, the article had a more serious tone than in previous articles about the RAF. It is 
furthermore the first article in Vorwärts where they refer to the group as ‘Rote Armee Fraktion’; ‘… 
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Die ,,Rote Armee Fraktion’’ (Wie sich der nach Polizeimeinung angeblich noch existierende und 
formierte ,,harte Kern’’ um Andreas Baader und Ulrike Meinhof) nennt, …’116 Previous newspapers 
spoke of the ‘Baader-Meinhof Bande’ or other combinations of names. This continuous altering of 
the name can even be interpreted that the group was not always taken seriously. After the attacks, 
however, they seem relatively careful with how they refer to the group and even question whether 
the group was responsible for all the attacks. Until 1972 the RAF was an interesting and exciting 
topic to write about. It seemed to have changed from May 1972. With the attacks in May 1972, the 
RAF and their threats got a different meaning and it seems that newspapers became more careful 
with parody and speculations about the group. 
A second development in the discourse within the left movement after the attacks was to 
refer to the RAF as right wing extremists instead of left wing extremists. This is very clear in the 
first reaction of Konkret in the article; ‘Die Rechte Armee Fraktion’.117 It seems that the media of 
the left movement was trying to create a gap between themselves and the attacks; ‘Die Presse, die 
Behörden, die Fernseh-Kommentatoren scheinen sich alle darin einig zu sein, daß die Bomben von 
sogenannten Linksradikalen gelegt wurden. Logischer is die Erklärung, daß die Anschläge durch 
eine rechte Gruppe ausgeführt wurden. Objektiv waren die Bombenleger Rechte – können nur 
Rechte sein.’118 
The Rote Fahne respondend in the same line as Konkret by calling the group right wing 
extremists instead of left wing extremists. The Rote Fahne even went as far as calling the group a 
fascist group. They, furthermore, criticized the fact that the RAF used names like ‘Kommando 2 
Juni’ due to the link with the student protest movement of the 1960s.119 This fits with the idea that 
the left media in general was trying to not associate itself with the RAF, by stating that they were 
the exact opposite. 
The attacks were spread over the month of May and it would have been possible to react to 
some of them before June 1972. Parts of the left media, however, waited until the arrest of Baader, 
Meins and Raspe that was broadcasted live on 1 June 1972, to react to the events of the previous 
month. The reasons for these late responses is unclear but it is possible that they were unsure of 
how to react to the events and waited for more clarity or that unclarity about what was to come 
prevented them from responding to the events. The arrest of Baader, Meins and Raspe as well as the
arrests of Gudrun, Meinhof and others over the days and weeks that followed caused relieve. The 
idea existed that the time of the RAF was over with the main members in prison. This meant that 
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journalists could come with their final analysis on the RAF and their attacks while they were 
imprisoned and started preparing for the court cases that awaited them.  
On 8 June 1972, Vorwärts wrote about the arrest of a few days earlier in the following 
article; ‘Baader – Im Porsche zur Revolution. Nach der Festnahme führender Gruppenmitglieder 
sind bei der Roten Armee Fraktion jetzt die Frauen am Drücker.’120 The article clearly showed that 
after the bomb attacks there was no respect or sympathy left for the RAF. Vorwärts criticized the 
RAF and at the same time praised the police. The response by Vorwärts seems logical. With the 
bomb attacks and the numerous victims as a result a line was crossed. Where the members of the 
RAF could have been seen as revolutionary fighters before, they now became criminals that 
attacked innocent civilians. Vorwärts previously criticized some of the policies of the SPD in the 
search for the RAF, however, after the attack they fully supported the SPD.
Along with Vorwärts also Konkret also expressed their anger towards the terrorist attacks. 
Like in 1970 after the escape of Baader, they interviewed different people from the left movement. 
Among these people Herbert Marcuse. The people that were interviewed all criticized and 
condemned the attacks. Herbert Marcuse stated that this would be counter revolutionary, a 
statement that was also frequently heard in 1970. The newspaper, however, also expressed their 
opinion against the Axel Springer concern. Röhl stated that they were just as guilty of the 
radicalization as the RAF. Where Vorwärts fully supported the SPD and only judged the actions of 
the RAF in May 1972 in their article, Konkret immediately incorporated the outside influences that 
might have helped the RAF to radicalize.
The debate within the Rote Fahne and the Rote Presse Korrespondenz after the attacks in 
May 1972, did not include the radicalization of the RAF or left radical violence. Their responses 
immediately focused on the state and police actions during the same time as the bomb attacks. This 
will be elaborated on in the next chapter. 
Within the K-Gruppen the Roter Morgen did respond on the attacks and showed its own 
form of radicalization. On 19 June 1972, they published an article where they explained their 
opinion on the attacks. With the Agit 883 no longer existing it seemed that the Roter Morgen had 
taken the most radical opinion. The Roter Morgen was critical of the attacks in May because, like 
with the escape of Baader, they interpreted it as individual actions. They furthermore were against 
the attacks where German civilians were targeted. The newspaper, however, stated that they would 
not refer to the members of the RAF as criminals. They furthermore stated that they did support the 
attacks against the American military basis and even celebrated the death of several American 
soldiers. 
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Although the response is fitting for a group that was against the United States and 
capitalism, it still was a radical point of view. With this response the Roter Morgen expressed the 
most radical opinion of the K-Gruppen. The softening response in the Rote Fahne and the 
radicalising response in the Roter Morgen showes that left radical violence caused disagreements 
within the K-Gruppen. For some the step from theoretical violence towards actual violence was a 
step to far. 
Left radical violence proved to be of great influence on the discourse within the left 
movement. This, however, was mainly centered around the escape of Baader on 14 May 1970 and 
the terrorist attacks in May 1972. The majority of the newspapers used for this research distanced 
themselves from both the escape in 1970, and the bomb attacks in 1972. In hindsight the escape of 
Baader heralded a new paradigm of left radical violence in West German history. In what way was 
off course unknown at the time. 
The escape of Baader caused for different responses from within the left movement, but all 
had in common that the responses were motivated from their own ideology and the majority 
disapproved the escape. Vorwärts, that represents a political party, responded by discrediting a 
political opponent, whereas Konkret tried to come to terms with the fact that one of its former 
journalists was a part of the escape and now wanted by the authorities. The K-Gruppen, on the other
hand, tried to distance themselves from the RAF in a fear of consequences by the state and police 
and the Agit 883  openly supported the escape but was dealing with internal struggles related to the 
escape. 
Where the initial responses seem logical and related to the different groups within the left 
movement, the absence of response on events between the escape in 1970 and the bomb attack in 
1972 is striking. Events like the death of Petra Schelm, the bank robberies and the publication of the
text ‘Das Konzept Stadtguerilla’ were not included in the discourse about left radical violence. 
Although striking, there are possible explanations why these events were not included in the 
discourse about left radical violence. The bank robberies were probably a more practical act of the 
RAF to finance their underground life and therefore not that interesting. The text of the RAF that 
was published in the Agit 883 might have been interpreted as just another theoretical threat. Up 
until the point of publication, the acts of the RAF can be seen as relatively mild, the text therefore 
might not have been taken seriously by the left movement. 
The death of Petra Schelm, on the other hand, must have caused debates that were not 
depicted in the newspapers. It was an event in which it was hard to deny the part Petra Schelm 
played in the events that led to her death. She was armed and used her weapon. The critique on this 
event will therefore come in the next chapter, overlooking the part of Petra Schelm and focusing on 
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the provoking measures of the police.   
The bomb attacks in May 1972 was the moment where the theoretical threat of left radical 
violence became a reality. The left movement were both shocked by the attacks and afraid of the 
repercussions by the state and police. The majority of the newspapers therefore not only distanced 
themselves from the attacks but stated that the RAF was a right wing group and that their acts were 
the opposite of the communist or socialist ideology. The response showed that the left movement 
was not only unable to identify with the RAF because of the attacks but also tried to disconnect the 
RAF from their own ideology in fear of state repercussions. The only exception was the Roter 
Morgen that clearly shows a support of some of the attacks. That shows that the different groups 
within the left movement were forced to rethink their position within the movement and that for 
instance the Roter Morgen seemed to have radicalized. They might have been filling the gap that 
was created after the Agit 883 stopped existing. 
It is clear that left radical violence had a strong influence on the left movement. After the 
attacks in May 1972 different groups within the left movement were forced to rethink their own 
position within the left movement. The attacks furthermore changed how the different groups within
the left movement presented their ideas on violence in their articles. 
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Chapter 3
The changing discourse within the West German left
movement due to the counter actions of the police and
authorities on left wing radical violence between 1970 -
1972
The previous two chapters dealt with a brief political history of West Germany, the 
development of the protest movement in the post-war period until 1970, and how the discourse on 
left extremist violence developed within the left movement in West Germany between 1970 – 1972.
It has become clear that most of the left movement in West Germany condemned the radicalization 
by members of the left. It is interesting that, although the government and press already spoke of 
terror and terrorism in 1970, the actual spread of violence by the radical left would not occur until 
May 1972, more than a year after the RAF was declared state enemy number one. Nevertheless the 
leftist movement felt the consequences of the Baader escape in the form of new laws and even 
greater forms of police interference and violence. 
How the reaction from the state and police influenced left movements in countries like West 
Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and the United States has already been described by Beatrice de 
Graaf in the book 'Theater van de angst'. In this chapter however, I will show how the counter-
reaction of the police and authorities towards the left in West Germany affected the discourse within
the left movement between 1970 and 1972. Ever since the start of the radicalization of the student 
protest movement, which started as early as 1964 but, mainly, from 1966 onwards, the left did not 
only reflect on themselves and their own actions, something they did at length, but also scrutinized 
the invasive and violent reactions of the police and authorities. From using physical violence 
against demonstrators, which was rumored to be provoked by Agent Provocateurs (undercover 
agents) during demonstrations. There were also arrests, house searches without warrants, expulsion 
from the University and preliminary confinement. 
Chapter one has already described the ongoing conflict between the protest movement and 
the police and authorities in the 1950s and 1960s. It has also been mentioned that besides the 
breakdown of the movement in 1968, there was a new generational conflict within the protest 
movement. Young people that joined the movement from 1968 onwards were more focused on 
action than, for instance, discussions, at least according to Karl A. Otto.  The protest movement may
have fallen apart in 1968, but the remaining members still had regular conflicts with the police. 
Reacting to the actions of the police and authorities after the escape of Baader, therefore, was 
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nothing new. The escape of Baader did, however, bring a whole new dimension into the discussion, 
since the actions of the police and authorities had changed as well as the way the left movement 
described these actions.
 The previous chapter has shown the reactions on the Baader escape within the left wing 
movement. It showed that the left wing movement was relatively unified in distancing itself from 
the escape, and declaring it as an individual action, with Agit 883 being the only one to support the 
escape. The writers of the articles did not limit themselves to write only about the escape and the 
group behind it. The ongoing conflict between the protest movement and the police and authorities 
was immediately present. In the articles, the left movement argues that many people from the left 
movement were incarcerated for long periods of time. In what way this fear was an actual reality is 
impossible to say, based on these sources. The fear, however, seemed genuine and often described 
in the articles. This fear and the scrutiny towards the police was especially strong within the K-
Gruppen.
 One of the things that immediately came up within the left movement, after the escape of 
Baader, was whether the police already knew of the upcoming escape beforehand. In their article of 
May 1970, the Rote Fahne blames the authorities for the fact that they, supposedly, knew about the 
escape plans 14 days in advance. The Rote Fahne, unfortunately, did not mention their sources, but 
according to them the police admitted that they knew about a possible escape, which they were just 
not able to prevent because it was unclear who was related to the rumor.‘Wollen Gefängnisleitung 
und Justizsenator uns im Ernst weismachen, sie hätten seit vierzehn Tagen von den 
Befreiungsplänen gewußt, seien leider einer Namensverwechslung zum Opfer gefallen? Uns ist klar,
daß die Senats-Clique durch Spitzel unterrichtet war, um anschließend eine Pogromstimmung 
entfesseln zu können.’121 
 It becomes clear that besides distancing themselves from the escape, the Rote Fahne also 
tried to link the escape to the police and authorities. The article described the fear of parts within the
left movement; that the escape could be used to justify any actions of the police and authorities 
against the left. They mainly base this on an event that happened just before the Baader escape. In 
the week before, a protester got shot by the police during a demonstration.  According to the Rote 
Fahne the police was in a difficult position because of this event, but the escape of Baader proved 
to be an easy way out, even justifying possible shootings, or in the words of the Rote Fahne future 
‘murder attempts’.  
This reaction of fear was not only seen at the Rote Fahne, as the other groups of the K-
Gruppen and Agit 883 had similar responses. Their articles often describe how the escape was used 
121 FU Berlin, APO, nr 3 Rote Fahne, Mai 1970, p. 3
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by the police and authorities to ‘come after’ people from the left wing movement. The atmosphere 
of fear was furthermore created through detailed eyewitness accounts of police raids that were 
several pages long. To increase this fear they often used aggressive and military language. It is 
important to note that most people within these movements probably had a real fear of the police 
and this fear was not completely unfounded. 
 On 29 May 1970, the Rote Presse Korespondenz published an article entitled 
‘Bürgerkriegsmanöver der Polizei in Westberlin’ that included the same events in it that were used 
for the article in the Rote Fahne. Police violence and especially the increased police violence after 
the escape of Baader are the main points in the article. The article combines several events that, in 
their opinion, show how the police and government were using the escape to their own advantage. 
For this article they included the demonstrations on 1 and 9 May 1970, that ended in violence 
between the police and the protesters, focusing heavily on the escalated demonstrations against the 
Allied military parade on Saturday 23 May 1970. 
It is possible that the events of 23 May 1970, were well documented in the mainstream 
media, since the article in the Rote Presse Korrespondenze does not specify the event; it just refers 
to ‘the Saturday before’. Another option is of course that the event made such a deep impression on 
parts of the left movement that an explanation was not needed. The article describes, in great detail, 
how the police used excessive force against protesters who demonstrated against the military parade
that involved the USA. 'Schon während des Aufmarsches der alliierten Truppen, der vor der TU 
durch doppelte Stacheldrahtrollen, eine doppelte Polizeikette und Wasserwerfer abgesichert war, 
versuchte die Polizei, das Rufen von antiimperialistischen und antimilitaristischen Parolen zu 
verhindern, indem sie Tränengasbomben in die Demonstranten war.’122  
The protesters demonstrated against the US involvement in Cambodia. According to the 
article, the police reacted with 5000 police officers against 500 protesters.  The article gives a 
graphic description of how the 5000 man police used physical force in the protest, and in 
‘Pogromstyle’ looked for protesters in the nearby buildings, shattering everything in its way. They 
continued to report that they did not believe that the police reacted to possible ‘hysterical 
disruptions by anarchists’, but that this was a strategically planned maneuver to show the power of 
the police. The police was in the highest state of emergency (not to be confused with the emergency
laws) since 17 June 1953.123 As described in the article the situation got so out of hand that (as 
recorded over the police radio) the next step in the escalation plan would have been the deployment 
of the Allied military forces. 
122 FU Berlin, APO, nr 66 Rote Presse korrespondenz, 29 May1970, p. 1-3
123 It is important to notice that this was the highest state of emergency without using the emergency laws. Besides for 
natural disaster the emergency laws have never been used in post war Germany.
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The article in the Rote Presse Korrespondenz is written in such a vivid way that it is easy to 
lose oneself in the emotions of the protesters. The article really managed to build up a feeling of 
civil war. It describes how the police tried to push the protesters together, after which they fled on to
the Technical University area, where they were met with support from students coming out of the 
cafeteria. This resulted in a shower of stones towards the police. According to the article the police, 
now faced with a bigger resistance, shot 600 cans of tear gas into the crowd of protesters, to break 
the resistance, and with crowbars and weapons they stormed the cafeteria of the TU, the students 
accommodation building and a studio of the University of Arts. 
The emotions of the event are well captured by a quote from a student, who, based on the 
article, unwillingly became involved.  ‘Ein Bewohner des Studentenheims berichtet: ''Als die 
Polizisten ohne anzuklopfen die Tür aufrissen, forderte ich einen Hausdurchsuchungsbefehl. 
Daraufhin stießen mich vier Polizisten zur Seite, drängten meine Freundin in eine Ecke und 
prügelten uns hinaus. Ich sah, wie auf zwei am Boden liegende eingeschlagen wurde. Mehr konnte 
ich nicht sehen, weil ich mit dem Gesicht zur Wand die Hände über dem Kopf verschränken mußte. 
And den Wänden meines Zimmer kann man 13 Striemen von Schlagstöcken erkennen....''.’'124 The 
article was full with descriptions such as the previous one.  For readers of the Rote Presse 
Korrespondenz (many of whom can be assumed to have joined in demonstrations from time to time)
this article must have had a great impact.
As mentioned before, the article included different events to show the escalation of the 
police and authorities in their ‘fight’ against the left. They quote Neubauer, interior senator of 
Berlin, who, in an interview, said that politics could not be the solution in the clash between the 
authorities and the left; only a stronger and militarized police force could be. ‘Es kann keinen 
Zweifel an dem Zusammenhang geben, der zwischen den Äußerungen Neubauers, der Polizeiatkion 
vom Samstag und der systematischen Pressekampagne besteht, die seit dem Fluchtunternehmen 
Andreas Baader gegen die Linken entfesselt wurde. Aus der Befreiung Baaders wurde jeden Tag 
neu der Beweis geschmiedet, daß nunmehr die ''APO'' ihre Verschwörungs- und Umsturzpläne 
militärisch vorbereite, daß die ''APO'' als waffenstarrende Armee auf den Plan trete, gegen die man
sich mit Waffengewalt zu wehren habe.’125 The quote shows that within the left movement it was 
believed that the government and police were creating new theories about the (former) APO, in 
order to legitimize armed actions. 
According to the article, the government and police did not only use the escape to justify 
actions afterwards, they also used it to cover up police actions from before the escape. Like the 
124 FU Berlin, APO, nr 66 Rote Presse korrespondenz, 29 May 1970, p. 1-3
125 FU Berlin, APO, nr 66 Rote Presse korrespondenz, 29 May 1970, p. 1-3
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Rote Fahne, they refer to the protester who got shot by a police officer during a demonstration in 
the week before the escape of Baader. According to the article the investigation of this incident had 
just started, when the Baader escape gave them a way out. Through this, the police managed to 
recover from their defensive position, in which they had to explain their actions, and could start an 
offensive against the leftist movement. Although the Rote Presse Korrespondenz described the 
counter action of the police, it seems it did not influence the Rote Presse Korrespondenz in May 
1970 in their opinion about the escape of Baader. Directly underneath this article they published the 
same statement against the escape of Baader as that was published in Rote Fahne. In the years to 
follow the police actions would overshadow the actions of left extremists themselves and would get 
more attention. An example of this will return later when the bomb attacks of May 1972 are 
covered. After the escape of Baader there was still room for the left newspapers to criticize both the 
left extremists as well as the police. 
In the following issue the Rote Presse Korrespondenz continued to criticize the authorities 
when, on 5 June, 1970, they wrote about new laws instated by the government, to oppress the 
working class and the left. In full communist style, they mainly focused on how the working class 
and the left were being oppressed in the form of, for instance, new taxes. In the same article they 
also focus on the increased police actions against the left movement. ‘Die Schußwaffen-Anwendung
gegen einzelne soll abschreckend gegen Demonstrationen wirken, die in ihrer Gesamtheit noch 
nicht durch die Arbeiterklasse bestimmt sind.’126  This quote gives a good example of how the 
articles in the Rote Presse Korrespondenz were heavily influenced by their communist ideals, by 
stating that the use of weapons will scare off the protesters and that the protest movement is not yet 
defined by workers.
 The article continues to describe how the excessive force used by the police against people 
in the left was becoming increasingly more common. The legal and moral boundaries of the police 
began to break down, making them more likely to gravitate towards violent tactics. The article 
suggest that members of the left were now afraid that they could be shot without legal consequences
for the police just for suspected behavior which they summarize as the following; ‘Der Wortlaut der
Gesetzesvorlage, besonders, daß schon geschossen werden darf, wenn jemand nur eines Vergehens 
''dringend verdächtig'' ist (Verdacht der Sachbeschädigung, verdacht der Körperverletzung, der 
Beamtenbeleidigung etc.)’127 
Looking at how the K-Gruppen reacted and commented on the actions of the police and 
authorities after the Baader escape, it becomes clear that there existed a great fear about what could 
126 FU Berlin, APO, nr 67 Rote Presse Korrespondenz, 5 June 1970, p. 1 - 4
127 FU Berlin, APO, nr 67 Rote Presse Korrespondenz, 5 June 1970, p. 1 - 4
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come next. There was the real worry that the escape of Baader would be used by the police to 
justify their actions against the left wing movement. They even went as far as saying that the police 
let the escape happen to hide events of the previous weeks. The militaristic and violent language 
used in the articles, combined with eyewitness accounts, only added to this atmosphere of fear and 
created a determination to fight back. 
In their response to the actions of the police and authorities, Konkret is in line with the 
responses of the K-Gruppen. In the article ‘Neubauers nützliche Idioten’, written by Claus Fried, 
they also state that the Baader escape only helped the police, since it justified the organization of 
new actions against the left wing movement. Other than the K-Gruppen, this response is more of an 
analysis than a reaction of fear.128 
The more interesting article of Konkret in reaction to the Baader escape and actions of the 
police was published in July 1970. It has already been mentioned that Konkret initially doubted the 
role of Ulrike Meinhof in the escape. This doubt was removed when Agit 883 published a letter, 
written by Ulrike Meinhof, on 22 May 1970. In this letter Meinhof clearly states that the RAF 
would not hesitate shooting a police officer.129 In the article ‘Ulrikes Rote Armee’, Konkret is 
appalled by Meinhofs letter. Konkret usually showed itself to be critical towards the system and 
police but in this rare occasion the writer argued that police officers are also just human beings and 
that parts of the police were even APO friendly. 
Analyzing the article in Konkret, it is possible this was more a personal reaction towards 
Ulrike Meinhof. As mentioned before it was the first article in which Konkret assumed Ulrike 
Meinhof was an active member of the RAF. The article also seems to be a direct response to 
Meinhof’s letter, something that was not that common for Konkret.
Konkret and the K-Gruppen had to process the consequences of the Baader escape and the 
counter reaction of the police and authorities, both in different ways. Konkret was shocked by the 
confirmation of the personal connection with Ulrike Meinhof, meaning that the K-Gruppen feared 
future consequences. Vorwärts found itself on the complete opposite side of Konkret and the K-
Gruppen. Since the SPD was in the government, they were partly responsible for the actions of the 
police and authorities, something that is reflected in their response to the counter actions by the 
police. 
The first time Vorwärts published a response on the actions of the police after the Baader 
escape, was on 2 July 1970. The article, with the title ‘Keinesfalls ein Instrument der Politik. Wie 
die Aufgabe der Polizei in unserer Demokratie formuliert sein muß / Von Heinz Ruhnau, 
128 FU Berlin, APO, nr 12 Konkret, 4 June 1970, p. 51
129 FU Berlin, APO, nr 61 Agit 883, 22 May 1970, p. 2
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Hamburger Innensenator.’, is a clear political response to the situation at that moment and the 
actions of the police. The article, which was written by a SPD politician, states that the police 
should not become a political instrument. Although left extremist violence is not mentioned, it  is 
clear that the article alludes to the clashes between the left protest movement and the police. An 
example of this is that the article states that politics should learn from current debates, outlining the 
roles of the police and that carrying hand grenades and machine guns is not one of them; the main 
role of the police should be to defend the basic law and democracy. 
 Considering the position of the author, it seems that this was a form of damage control to 
both the moderate and the more extreme left within the SPD, in regards to the Baader escape and 
the events that followed. On the one hand they stated that the police should stand up against left 
extremist violence, but on the other hand, should not make that into a political battle. It could have  
also been a reaction against the CDU/CSU, the political opponent of the SPD. The more 
conservative parties wanted to limit the right to strike and protest, as well as more and more heavily
armed police forces. 
The fact that the magazine Vorwärts was the newspaper for the SPD, a political party in the 
coalition, does influence the way in which the newspaper reacts to events. Since the SPD was not 
only in the national government, but also in many state and regional governments, they were often 
entangled with police reactions, something that is shown in a different article in the same issue.  In 
the same issue, there is an article about clashes between police and students in the week before. The
students protested against the banning of the SDS in Heidelberg. In the article, Walter Krause, SPD 
politician in the state politics, defended the police actions by saying that the demonstration ‘got out 
of hand’ and that the police was therefore ‘justified’ in their actions.
The number of articles on the counter actions of the police and authorities in left newspapers
was very low in the second half of 1970. The most logical explanation for this is that in the second 
half of 1970, after the initial shock, people lost interest in the Baader escape. The RAF, furthermore,
had fled to the Middle East where they received guerrilla training. When they returned they kept a 
low profile, aside from  the three bank robberies on 29 September 1970, the most remarkable event 
was the arrest of Mahler, Schubert and Goergens on 8 October 1970. This is only mentioned by a 
few newspapers, and in the case of Konkret, focused more on the people that were arrested. Only 
the Rote Presse Korrespondenz devoted two more articles on the counter actions taken by the police
and authorities.
On 24 July 1970, the Rote Presse Korrespondenz responded to the Heidelberger SDS ban 
and the resulting clashes between the protesters and the police. This is the same incident as was 
mentioned in an article in Vorwärts, where the use of police violence was defended.  According to 
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the article in the Rote Presse Korrespondenze, the ban was more than just a ban of an organization. 
According to the article this was a step in a bigger process towards banning communist and socialist
groups and organizations in general. There were rumors that the discussion for the ban was not 
made on a local level, but on a national level at the home secretary in Bonn. 
The second article was published on 16 October 1970, as a response to the arrest of Mahler, 
Schubert and Goergens on 8 October 1970. Under the title ‘ERKLÄRUNG, Zur Verhaftung des 
Genossen Mahler’ the article claims that the arrest of Mahler had nothing to do with actual crimes 
committed by him, but with the government scheming against communists. The article continues by
implying that the state tried to scare off potential lawyers from defending communists and 
socialists. This was because Mahler acted as the lawyer for parts of the protest movement in the late
1960s. 
The article also talked about increased actions by the police and authorities against members
of the left movement. According to members of the left movement, for several months certain 
houses and people were under constant watch by heavily armed police officers. The article 
describes illegal house searches where anything that could be connected to the opposition was taken
as evidence. For example, they took a document which included correspondence with Rudi 
Dutschke that was intended for university research. Lastly the article mentioned that people were 
confined for longer amounts of time and that even death was a real possibility in their opinion. The 
articles by the Rote Presse Korrespondenz were in line with their articles written earlier that year. 
The articles from 24 July 1970 and 16 October 1970 confirmed the fear that already existed in the 
articles that spring. It shows, that in their opinion, the police and authorities were not just looking 
for the RAF, but were also coming after communists and socialists. To what extent these fears and 
the examples mentioned in the articles can be confirmed is not possible to say based on these 
sources, but for the left movement this fear was a reality. 
It becomes clear that the counter reaction of police and authorities after the Baader escape 
was processed in different ways by the left movement. From careful analysis of the articles by the 
leftist movement it becomes clear that they did not sympathize with the escape of Baader, but rather
they were  heavily criticizing the actions of the police. The way this was expressed varied. Since the
SPD was in the government, Vorwärts was the only newspaper to not express the fear that the 
escape would be beneficial for the police and authorities. Instead, they published an article 
explaining the role of the police and expressed their opposition to a more heavily armed police 
force. Konkret struggled with their response. It was clear that they were against the measures taken 
by the police but were also conflicted in the way the RAF judged the police. The K-Gruppen 
reacted with fear towards the  possible consequences and doubted the validity or truth of the actions
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of the police. Other than Vorwärts and Konkret, the followers of the K-Gruppen had a more pressing
reason to fear the consequences. 
 The year 1970 was mostly marked by the Baader escape, the Mahler arrest and the start of 
intensified actions by the police. In 1971, the measures taken by the police and the government 
would intensify even more. These strongly intensified measures started on 13 February 1971 when 
the RAF was declared state enemy number one. Other events that shaped 1971 where the trial 
against Mahler, the shooting of Petra Schelm and the shooting of Georg von Rauch. 
The first response to this from the left movement came in February 1971. On 26 February 
1971, the Rote Presse Korrespondenz published an article with the title ‘Die Hetzjagd des 
Staatsapparats auf eine angebliche Baader-Bande soll die Illegalisierung der Kommunistischen 
bewegung vorbereiten.’130 In this article they heavily criticize the increasingly violent actions of the 
police, which had occurred in the months before. They described that the state, police and media 
had been on a manhunt for several months, that had intensified since the start of February to find 
members who the police identified as members of the RAF. The newspaper wrote that the state used
the violent and armed escape of Baader on 14 May 1970 to legitimize this intensified search.131 The 
biggest critique from the Rote Presse Korrespondenz, is that with very little proof, and because of 
the actions of one small group, the whole left movement had become marginalized. Based on this 
response it is fair to assume that the members of the K-Gruppen experienced strong changes after 
the escape of Baader. Again, this contributed to the fear that the authorities wanted to ban 
communist groups.
The feeling of persecution by the police and authorities within parts of the left movement 
was confirmed when they started to be accused of the most varying crimes. The members of the K-
Gruppen complained that, when one had a left ideology or were somehow linked to the ‘criminals’, 
they were battered by the police with unlawful house searches and long interrogations. ‘Es geht 
aber gar nicht um die Erschießung von ''Mitgliedern der Bande'', sondern, wie der Frankfurter 
Vorfall am besten beweist, um das ''Recht'', beliebige verdächtige Personen ohne größere Umstände
zu ermorden. Da der Terror des Staatsapparats auf die Dauer nicht mehr mit ''Notwehr'' einzelner 
Polizei-Banditen erklärt werden kann … der Staatsapparat will in Zukunft von der Annahme 
ausgehen dürfen, daß seine Gegner bewaffnet sind, daß demzufolge sofort geschossen werden darf; 
die Öffentlichkeit soll an solche ''Vorfälle' gewöhnt werden.’132 
The article not only describes the increased measures taken by the police against the left 
movement, it also described how the left was treated differently from right wing extremists. While 
130 FU Berlin, APO, nr 104 Rote Presse Korrespondenz, 26 February 1971, p. 1-3
131 FU Berlin, APO, nr 104 Rote Presse Korrespondenz, 26 February 1971, p. 1-3
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53
members of the left were battered for menial crimes by the police and authorities, right wing 
extremists were believed to receive lighter punishments.  For instance, they claim that when 
firearms were found at the residence of right wing extremists, they were released following a simple
ID check. Under the same circumstances,  the Rote Presse Korrespondenz claimed that if Das 
Kapital was found next to the weapon, it would lead to a long prison sentence. ‘Obwohl bei dem 
festgenommenen Dutzend Faschisten mehr Waffen sichergestellt wurden, als zur Bewaffnung eines 
Bataillons notwendig sind, obwohl ‘’altes’’  nationalsozialistisches Schriftmaterial in Massen 
aufgefunden wurde, entließ man die Banditen nach Feststellung ihrer Personalien; wieviele Monate
Untersuchungshaft wären jemandem sicher gewesen, bei dem neben der Pistole das Kapital 
aufgefunden worden wäre?’133
In the same month, Agit 883 also published an article with the same message. They gave an 
overview of events and how the police was using the laws to its limits. Along the same lines as the 
Rote Presse Korrespondenz, they describe how people from the left movement were being 
terrorized. It gave an example of how the police broke into a house of a mother with her 4 young 
children, in the middle of the night with live firearms. Both articles saw the intensified prosecutions 
of the police not just as a search for the RAF, but as an attack against the left as a whole. 
In March the denouncement of the left wing movement by the authorities continued. 
According to the Rote Fahne the authorities were creating a web of lies about the RAF and were 
loosing the overview themselves. That the RAF became an easy scapegoat for the authorities 
became clear in the fact that the group was blamed for various crimes. The most remarkable of 
which was the kidnapping of a young child in Munich, an act that, according to Horst Mahler, the 
RAF that fights in the names of the murdered children of Vietnam and other atrocities, could never 
do. This letter of Mahler, which was published in several newspapers, was written in prison where 
he, Shoebert and Goergens were on trial for their participation in the escape of Baader and other 
crimes committed by the group. 
For large parts of the left movement the trial against Mahler became the embodiment of the 
persecution against the left.134 Besides the concerns about the trials against the members of the RAF,
especially the members of the K-Gruppen and Agit 883 feared preventive detention when there was 
a possible link to ‘criminal organizations’. Which meant that they feared preventive confinement for
possible links to more left extremist groups. ‘Seit einigen Monaten ist die Justiz dazu 
übergegangen, unter Umgehung elementarer Vorschriften der Strafprozeßordnung Genossen ohne 
rechtliche Grundlage in den Untersuchungshaft allein aufgrund unhaltbarer Vermutungen bedeutet 
133 FU Berlin, APO, nr 104 Rote Presse Korrespondenz, 26 February 1971, p. 2-3
134 Although the trials was against three people, it was the process against Mahler that attracted the attention. The two 
women were often not included in the articles. 
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de facto die Durchführung der Vorbeugehaft.’135
Fear of persecution of the left movement was also visible in the Roter Morgen. They 
compared the trail of 1971 with the Nazi trial against Marines van der Lubbe in 1933, for setting the
Reichstag on fire. This comparison of the persecution of the left movement to the nazi past was 
made more often. ‘Genscher auf den Spuren Görings. Einem neuen Reichstagsbrandprozeß 
entgegen.’ They compare the two trials because according to the Roter Morgen, just as in 1933, the 
trial is an attempt to ban the left. ‘So hieß es in einer Sondernnummer des ''Bundeskriminalblattes', 
… : ''Die Angehörigen der Gruppe seien davon überzeugt, daß auch die gültige Rechtsordnung nur 
Ausdruck der 'Volksfeindlichen Gewaltverhältnisse' in der BR Deutschland sei.'' Davon ist 
allerdings jeder Marxist-Leninist, jeder Kommunist überzeugt, was damit also de facto eine 
Kriminalisierung der gesamten marxistisch-leninischtischen Linken bedeutet.’136
It is obvious that the increased measures taken by the police and authorities had a higher 
effect on the members of the K-Gruppen and Agit 883 than on the readers of Konkret or Vorwärts. 
The eagerness to interpret all the actions taken by the police and authorities as actions to ban the left
and therefore respond to these actions was higher among the K-gruppen and Agit 883. An example 
of this is the trial against Mahler, Goergens and Schubert, an event that was reported about 
frequently by the K-Gruppen and less by Vorwärts and Konkret. For the K-Gruppen the trial became
even more important when the crown witness of the state was presented, Peter Urbach. Urbach was 
an undercover agent that participated in many demonstrations during the late 1960s, and according 
to members of the protest movement, often initiated violence between the protesters and the police. 
The Rote Presse Korrespondenz wrote that the trial against Mahler, Goergens and Schubert 
was a trial against the complete left movement. In the article they expressed that they believed the 
government was fighting a losing battle, and in order to turn the tables in their favor, the 
government presented Peter Urbach as a witness. The role of Urbach was seen as a bigger plan of 
the government by the left movement. Since parts of the left believed he intentionally started 
violence in the late 1960s during demonstrations, it was the police that started the violence since he 
was a undercover agent. This was therefore seen as a long lasting plan by the police and authorities 
to find reasons to ban the left.137
In July 1971, Petra Schelm, member of the RAF, was killed after she and Werner Hoppe fled
at a roadblock looking for the RAF. This incident, however, was not cause for great discussion in 
the left newspapers. Only Vorwärts and Roter Morgen dedicated an article to the incident. It is not 
clear why the other newspapers did not write about it. The majority of the left newspapers were not 
135 FU Berlin, APO, nr 106 Rote Presse Korrespondenz, 12 April 1971, p. 7
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supporting the RAF, however, they were also against the extra measures taken by the police and 
authorities. It is possible that some of the newspapers did not know how to interpret the fact that 
Petra Schelm fled and was armed with a firearm.
The Roter Morgen, the more radical newspaper of the K-Gruppen, wrote about the incident 
in August 1971. In their article with the title; ‘Vorbereitung der offentlichte Meinung auf die 
physische Liquidatien von Kommunisten. POLIZEI ORGANISIERT STRASSENSCHLACHT. … die 
Bevölkerung an faschistische Terrormaßnahmen zu gewöhnen und einzuschüchtern.’138 The Roter 
Morgen again makes a comparison to the Nazi era, by referring to the police as ‘Genschers 
Sturmstaffel’.139 To describe the mass use of police force in Hamburg in the search of the RAF, the 
Roter Morgen used a quote of der Spiegel. According to this article, 3000 police officers who were 
all armed with machine guns, teargas, bulletproof vests and walkie talkies (a new innovation at the 
time, since der Spiegel had to explain the use of walkie talkies) were put on strategic points in 
Hamburg and Bremen. Like before by the Rote Presse Korrespondenz, this was interpreted as the 
bigger strategy of the police to ban the left movement, according to Roter Morgen.
Chapter two already showed that there was surprisingly little coverage  in the left media on 
the shooting of Petra Schelm in regards to left extremist violence. The counter actions of the police 
and media initially also got little attention in the left media. Only Vorwärts and the Roter Morgen 
reacted to the news in the immediate months to follow. The reaction of Roter Morgen, however, is 
not surprising. It continues in the same way as previous articles, explaining that this event was again
a measure of the government to persecute the left movement and to prepare the general public for 
this ‘liquidation’ of the left movement. ‘Der Mord an Petra Schelm zeigt, daß der Staatsapparat 
sich nicht mehr begnügt, seine Macht zu zeigen, sondern daß er sie zur planmäßigen Ausrottung 
von ,,Staatsfeinden'' einzusetzen beginnt. Der Mord an Petra Schelm war nur der Anfang einer 
systematischen Kampagne, um die öffentliche Meinung auf die geplante physische Liquidation der 
revolutionären Kräfte in unserem Land vorzubereiten.’140 
The article in Vorwärts gives more of a description of the incident. The article focuses on the
chain of events that led to the shooting of Petra Schelm. The journalist tried to combine the official 
statements of the police with a description of the incident and that of bystanders. In the article, 
however, the journalist also criticizes the reports of other newspapers and the size of the action, the 
largest one since World War II. It also showed how, besides people with a left ideology, others were 
now also  experiencing the counter measures of the police. The president of the Junge Union, the 
youth party of the CDU, was taken to the police station since he did not have his car documents or 
138 FU Berlin, APO, nr 8 Roter Morgen, August 1971, p. 1 - 2
139 Genscher was the Minister of interior affairs in the BRD.
140 FU Berlin, APO, nr 8 Roter Morgen, August 1971, p. 1-2
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identification with him. 
The responses of Vorwärts and the Roter Morgen showed two different perspectives of how 
the shooting of Petra Schelm was interpreted. For the moderate left it was more an incident that 
fitted in the situation at hand. The misunderstanding of the president of the Junge Union was 
presented as a silly incident in this large search action. For the more extreme left the shooting 
proved once again that the the police and authorities were preparing the population for a general 
execution of the ‘revolutionary forces’. The incident with the president of the Junge Union was a 
daily reality, or at least fear, for the members of the Roter Morgen.  
Besides this article the only other article published until December 1971 was again from the 
Roter Morgen which was about how the police acted when a left wing facility was attacked by right 
wing extremists ‘Naziüberfall auf marxistisch-leninistische Buchhandlung’. The article described 
the attack on a left facility by neo Nazis and how, with the use of brass knuckles they managed to 
get in, destroy the interior and attack two of the people inside. The article continues on how it took 
the police 20 minutes to get to the facility, despite the police station being just three minutes away, 
and arrested 3 of left people first. The police assumed that the left people attacked the neo Nazis. In 
this misjudgment of the situation the attackers could even continue their violence in the presence of 
the police. ‘Die Polizei, die, wenn es gegen Linke oder von ihnen für links gehaltene Gruppen geht, 
mit äußerster Brutalität vorgeht, die bundesweite Fahndungen wegen der Baader-Meinhoff-Gruppe
veranstaltet und dabei mit der maschinenpistole durch die Gegend knallt, die Morde gegen Linke 
begeht, wie den Mord an Petra Schelm, dieselbe Polizei geht bei offensichtlichen Terrorakte der 
Faschisten nicht gegen diese vor, sondern gegen die Überfallenen.’141
The articles, published by the Roter Morgen in the second half of 1971 show that parts of 
left not only felt prosecuted by the police and government, but also felt that they were treated in a 
different way than right wing extremists. Since the police only targeted left revolutionary and 
terrorist groups between 1970 and 1972 it is to expect that there existed a form of frustration on the 
side of the left movement, that people in right wing groups received lighter punishments for 
comparable acts.142
The most influential event on how the left newspapers responded to the counter actions of 
the police, in 1971, was the death of Georg von Rauch. On 4 December 1971, Georg von Rauch 
was shot when the police wanted to search the car he was in. The death of Georg von Rauch caused 
controversy for two reasons. Firstly, the left movement immediately made the comparison with the 
death of Benno Ohnesorg, in 1967, who also died after being shot by a police officer. Secondly, 
141 FU Berlin, APO, nr 14 Roter Morgen, 20 November 1971, p. 1
142 B. de Graaf, Theater van de angst. De strijd tegen terrorisme in Nederland, Duitsland, Italie en Amerika, 
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after the death of Georg von Rauch the police changed their story of the chain of events several 
times. The initial report of the police was that Georg von Rauch was a member of the RAF, he 
supposedly shot at the police first and in doing so heavily wounded a police officer. The police, 
however, had to change its story because an elderly couple witnessed the event. There, furthermore, 
was a tape recording of their phone call to the emergency services which uncovered a different line 
of events than that was presented by the police. 
As a result of the tape of the emergency call, made by the elderly couple, it became clear 
that the initial police report was false. Due to this proof of the lie by the police about the shooting, 
the coverage about this event got a new dimension. Vorwärts probably had the most interesting 
response. On 16 December 1971 Vorwärts published an article about the shooting of Georg von 
Rauch entitled: ‘Hysterie mit Todesfolge. Georg von Rauch in Berlin getotet: 17 Schusse, ein Toter 
und hundert Versionen.’143 The article gives an account of the uncertainty surrounding the death of 
Georg von Rauch, days after he was fatally shot by a police officer. It acknowledged the wrongful 
statements made by the police in the immediate days after the shooting. It furthermore 
acknowledges that without the hysteric search for the RAF this would not have happened. 
The newspaper, however, did not distance itself from some of the other statements made by 
the police as fast as the other left newspapers did. Vorwärts is the only left newspaper, used for this 
research, that presented the opinion that there was also blame on Georg von Rauch himself. The 
article ends with the sentence ‘Das in Berlin geschossen wurde, offenbar von beiden Seiten, ist 
unbestritten. Ob Ohne Polizeiversagen und Baader-Meinhof-Hysterie hatte geschossen werden 
mussen, bliebt vorlaufig strittig.’144 
This response, as were their previous responses, again showed the link of the SPD to the 
government. It is likely it would have been unacceptable for the SPD or for members of the SPD to 
express their support of Georg von Rauch due to the more moderate left character of the SPD. At 
the same time it was impossible to not criticize the police at all, since the police itself had to admit 
the wrongful statements they made about the events surrounding the death of Georg von Rauch. 
The false statement of the police was the main topic for every newspaper that wrote about 
the death of Georg von Rauch. Konkret published an article on 30 December 1971, entitled ‘,,Es 
wird geschossen, Mensch!’145 The article itself exists largely out of copies of the protocol of the 
emergency phone call that was made by the elderly couple. The article is critical of the police but 
seems to attempt to stay neutral as much as possible. The reason for the neutral tone is unsure but it 
is likely that Konkret was also confused by the unclarity surrounding the shooting of Georg von 
143 Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, nr 51 Vorwärts, 16 December 1971, p. 7
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Rauch, and therefore published a less opinionated article. It is, however, also possible that Konkret 
considered the printing of the phone call protocol a clear message itself, and expected that the 
protocol would have enough impact on its readers. 
For the K-Gruppen the shooting of Georg von Rauch was of high importance. The earlier 
mentioned fear of the K-Gruppen came back in the articles dedicated to Georg von Rauch. At the 
same time the articles expressed a form of frustration and anger. They show that for the different K-
Gruppen there was no doubt that the death of Georg von Rauch was Murder. ‘Zur Ermorderung 
Georg v. Rauchs’146 It furthermore becomes clear that the journalists again tried to separate the RAF
and the left by explaining Marxism and Leninism and with that explaining why the RAF was not 
socialist or communist. 
Like Vorwärts and Konkret, the different K-Gruppen dedicated large parts of their articles 
about the death of Georg von Rauch in their search to uncover the truth. The Rote Presse 
korrespondenz did this in the article entitled ‘SCHLUSS MIT DEN BURGERKRIEGSMANOVERN 
DER POLIZEI!’147 In many ways the article repeated the message that they already spread before, 
the fact that in their opinion the police and authorities would go to great lengths to ban the left 
movement. The part that stands out in this article is that at the end they also refer to the death of 
Petra Schelm, something that was not done in this way by the K-Gruppen in the immediate 
aftermath of her death. It is  likely that immediately after the death of Petra Schelm there was doubt 
about how to react, due to the circumstances that led to her death. Not one of the left newspapers 
used for this research used the death of Petra Schelm to accuse the police of Murder, directly after 
the incident. The death of Georg von Rauch, however, gave them enough reason to do so: ‘Sagen 
wir es klar: Der Tod von Georg v. Rauch war kalkuliert, wie davor der Petra Schelms nicht minder. 
Sie mussten sterben, weil der herrschenden Klasse die bisherigen Abschreckungs und 
Unterdruckungsinstrumente nicht mehr ausreichen.’148
The death of Georg von Rauch clearly attracted different kind of reactions from different 
parts of the left movement. Although earlier events and police actions already had mixed responses 
from the left movement, this event caused the most interesting divers responses of the left 
newspapers. All the newspapers gave their own explanation of the shooting and drew their own 
conclusions from it. For the more left extreme groups like the K-Gruppen it was clear that the death 
of Georg von Rauch was ‘murder’ and an action that was planned beforehand by the police. 
Konkret mainly criticized the changing response of the police in the days after the shooting. 
Vorwärts presented a complete different opinion than the other newspapers. Like the other 
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newspapers Vorwärts gave their version of the events but unlike the others is more reserved with 
giving an immediate opinion. They, furthermore, put some responsibility of the shooting at Georg 
von Rauch, something only they did. 
1971 marked the positioning of the RAF as state enemy number one and therefore sparked 
an increase in police violence and control, specially towards the left movement. The left movement 
highly criticized the police actions that did not only impact their lives greatly, but were also very 
expensive and had very little results. Parts of the left movement did not see the measures taken by 
the police as a panic reaction but as a strategic mission to fight the left. The state tried to accuse 
parts of the left movement of many crimes like a child abduction which was without basis or proof. 
Furthermore, many members within the left movement were convinced that the police and 
authorities were specifically aiming their attention and actions towards the left movement, whereas 
the right wing movement saw less consequences for more serious acts. 
It were mainly the newspapers of the K-Gruppen that wrote about the police actions, 
probably because they had more readers that felt the consequences than for instance the readers of 
the Konkret that were more from the bourgeois. The Konkret did not write about the topic until the 
death of Georg von Rauch in December 1971. The killing of Georg von Rauch, for which the police
tried to cover up, sparked fear within the left movement because it was the confirmation of 
something the Rote Fahne already wrote about in 1970, the idea that the police tried to create a 
situation in which it was excepted to kill left people. 
Until 1972, the actual crimes of the RAF were limited to the escape and the bank robberies. 
In 1972 the RAF started its spread of violence by bomb attacks in May of that year. Until 1972, 
however, the police actions against the left movement already intensified and parts of the left 
movement felt they were haunted by the police and authorities in their attempt to ban the left. 
People within the left movement were in fear of loosing their jobs. Besides that, the rumor about the
police strategy to ‘shoot first and ask questions later’ was widely spread among the members of the 
left movement, and was again a reason for fear. These fears became stronger in 1972 with the 
Radikalen Gesetze and the bomb attacks in May of that year. There was a short moment of relieve 
among the German population when the most important members of the RAF were arrested in June 
and July of that year. This moment of relieve, however, was short lived due to the kidnapping and 
killing of the Israeli athletes by members of the Palestinian terror organization ‘Black September’  
during the 1972 Olympic games in Munich and the fact that with the arrest of the most important 
members of the RAF itself was not dissolved. 
The year 1972 started for the left movement with the aftermath of the death of Georg von 
Rauch. Due to the continuing changing story of the police about the shooting, the complete left 
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movement criticized the actions of the police, even in Vorwärts. On 20 January 1972, Vorwärts 
published a column  that mainly criticized the extreme stigmatization of the RAF in the media. ‘Die
Baader-Meinhof-Gruppe hat Straftaten auf dem Gewissen, aber sie ist nicht jener teufliche Erzfeind
der guten Menschen, als der sie in gewissen Presse-Erzeugnissen wider besseres Wissen immer 
noch dargestellt wird.’149 Compared to the previous articles that were published in Vorwärts, this 
response seems somewhat surprising. On the other hand it was hard to deny the false statements 
made by the police to the public. With the death of Georg von Rauch, it is furthermore possible that 
Vorwärts was forced to address the problems between the police and the left movement. A last 
reason that might be responsible for the reaction is that colleague journalists were arrested as 
possible members of the RAF. It seems that the journalists realized that the search for the RAF 
members by the police became a very expensive and invasive endeavor, a lot larger than needed.
The critique on the financial expenses made by the police in their search of the RAF was 
also expressed in the Roter Morgen. In their article entitled ‘Polizeiterror, Notstandsübungen, 
Mobilmachungsübungen: die Angst der Herrschenden’ published on 31 January 1972, they not only
criticize the high amount of house searches acted out by the police, they also addressed the fact that 
the actions of the police were very expensive. The article described the large search action by the 
police on 13 January 1972, the largest since the ending of World War II, to find the members of the 
RAF. The article described how all over the BRD on that day police controlled and searched streets,
highways, garages and houses. How the police, furthermore, flew with helicopters over the 
complete country and how people that were leaving or entering the country were under extra 
control. They criticized the scale of the action of which the only goal was, according to the police, 
to find six anarchists. ‘Eine ganze Armee von Schwerbewaffneten Polizisten, eine Fahndung, die 
Millionen kostet. Lediglich um ein paar Hansel der sogenannten Baader Meinhof-Gruppe zu 
fangen? Und dann noch ohne Erfolg. Nein. Druck wollen sie ausüben, einschüchtern, 
terrorisieren!’150
In the aftermath of the death of Georg von Rauch the government presented the idea of 
Radikalen Gesetze in January 1972. These laws were directed against both left wing extremists and 
right wing extremists. Previously was already shown that, due to the actions of the police, parts of 
the left movement experienced heavier consequences than the right wing extremists suspects. The 
law was again used as prove by parts of the left movement to show how the police was coming after
them in order to ban the left. 
The announcement of the new law was criticized by different newspapers in the left 
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movement. The Rote Presse Korrespondenz wrote about the newly proposed laws on 28 January 
1972, in the article entitled ‘Kommunistenverfolgung in der BRD und Westberlin’. The article 
described how the law was the next step for the police and authorities to ban the left movement. 
‘Dieser jüngste Verstoß konzentriert sich auf die kommunistischen und sozialistischen Kräfte an der
Uni und an der Schule und dient darüberhinaus dazu, fortschrittliche Universtätsangehörige und 
lehrer einzuschüchtern und von einem Bündnis mit den Kommunisten abzuhalten.’151 With the fear 
that was already expressed by the different K-Gruppen it is logical that this law was a confirmation 
of that fear. The fear of losing ones job for being associated with a left organization gave a whole 
new dimension to the fear that already existed among members of the K-Gruppen and other more 
extreme left organizations. 
Like the Rote Presse Korrespondenz also Konkret heavily criticized the newly proposed 
laws. In their issue of 27 January 1972, Klaus Reiner Röhl wrote about the new law in the 
introductory article from the publisher. Under the title ‘Barzel, Verfassungsfeind Nr.1?’ he described
why, in his opinion, the law was against the basic law. This article shows that the fear that before 
mainly lived among the members of the K-Gruppen was spreading through the left movement. 
Konkret already wrote about how people that identified themselves as communist or socialists had 
to worry about being treated differently by the police than people with other ideologies. This article,
however, showed a same kind of frustration about the persecution of the left as was shown earlier 
by the K-Gruppen. 
The one newspaper that did not write about the new laws was Vorwärts. On the one side it is
surprising there was no article about the laws in Vorwärts. Since the SPD was in the government 
one could expect the newspaper of that political party to write about it. On the other hand it is also 
possible that not all the members of the SPD supported the law. Either from an ethical point of view
or because of the measures that started to effect lives of people that were unlikely to be linked with 
the RAF and were unproportionally punished by the law.  
With the death of Georg von Rauch, the intensified police actions and the Radikalen Gesetze
it is logical that the idea of a prosecution against the left was vivid among members of the left 
movement. This idea was once again fed by the arrest of a member of the left movement. The 
person that was arrested, however, caused for extra controversy because it was Johann von Rauch, 
the brother of Georg von Rauch. With the death of Georg von Rauch only two months earlier 
members of the left movement were outraged by the arrest.
Within the K-Gruppen especially, the arrest and trial against Johann von Rauch caused a 
shock. It also, once more,  proved their opinion that the police was haunting members of the left. 
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Both Rote Presse Korrespondenze and Roter Morgen wrote about the arrest and what this meant 
according to their opinion. On 18 February 1972, Rote Presse Korrespondenze published and article
entitled ‘INSZENIERTE PROZESSE: VORBEREITUNG AUF DIE VERFOLGUNG VON 
KOMMUNISTEN’152. Roter Morgen published a similar article entitled ‘SCHAUPROZESS GEGEN 
J.H. VON RAUCH’153 on 28 February 1972. 
In their article, Roter Morgen argued that the authorities were trying to find ways to 
prosecute the left movement. They named examples of how the authorities were fabricating 
evidence to make sure left people that were charged with a crime, would be convicted. They state 
that the police used hearsay witnesses, that were undercover agents, instead of believing actual 
eyewitnesses. What they most of all criticized was that left people were in Untersuchungshaft for 
longer than a year. They dedicated this all to the goal of the police and government to make it easier
to prosecute communists and ‘vortschritliche menschen’.  
Due to the amount of articles about the arrest of Johan von Rauch in the newspapers of the 
K-Gruppen and the lack of these articles in for instance Konkret or Vorwärts it is clear that this 
arrest made a stronger impact on the K-Gruppen. It is likely that members of the K-Gruppen could 
identify themselves with the Von Rauch brothers, maybe even knew them. The articles are 
furthermore explainable by the fact that with the death of Georg von Rauch the police was not 
willing to come forward with the truth, only after it was no longer possible to hold on to their 
version of the truth they changed their official statement of the events that led to the death of Georg 
von Rauch. That the police still arrested his brother was therefore shocking. The articles did 
describe that Johan von Rauch had a gun with him. This, however, did not effect their persistence 
on defending Johan von Rauch. This might be a consequence of the strong reaction of the 
authorities towards the left movement. With the fear of prosecution they might have been more 
compelled to protect the left movement and their members in newspapers that were also available 
for the police than to give the police ammunition against the left movement. 
In 1971 Konkret paid little attention to left wing extremism and the reaction of the police. In 
1972, however, they published a series of three articles, in February and March, in which they 
analyzed the RAF and the developments around the group intensively. What is interesting about the 
articles is that they claim that the information was based on insider information of which they did 
not disclose how they got that information. The articles, among others, describe situations amid the 
members of the RAF only an insider could know. The articles furthermore described three different 
elements that existed around the RAF,  the main actors, the police and people that were drawn in the
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chaos around the group. 
The first of these articles was published on 10 March 1972, in which they mainly criticized 
the main actors of the RAF. How the ideals of the left movement disappeared the moment of the 
Baader escape and how expensive items like clothes are now used in their quest to hide from the 
police. The second article was published on 24 March 1972 and disapproved the role of the police. 
The article mainly criticized how, after the Baader escape, the smallest crime was seen as 
dismantling the society and therefore justifying the extreme measures taken by the government and 
police. The last article was published on 9 March 1972 and focused on how people were cornered in
the situation around the RAF. For example, they mentioned the father of Petra Schelm, the members
of the RAF that were already in jail (apposed to the main members that were better equipped to 
disappear from the police and authorities) and the left movement in general. 
In this series of three articles, the response to the actions of the police is for the most part 
cynical. ‘Das heiβt (vergleichsweise), daβ ein RAF-Trüppchen Polizei, Bundeswehr und 
Bundesgrenzschutz unterlaufen könnte, und zwar mit einer Geheimwaffe names 
,,Gesamtkonzeption’’.’154 The article focused on the statements of the police in which the police 
declared to see the RAF as a forceful enemy of democracy and the state and believed the number of 
members were over 10 000. 
The reaction of Konkret fits with the developments up until that point. The reaction of the 
police, compared the the actual actions of the RAF, was exceptionally strong. The amount of 
members of the RAF was a great discussion point among the authorities and the left movement. The
left movement often criticized the number that was communicated by the police and authorities. If 
Konkret had actual information, which is not unlikely due to Ulrike Meinhof, this would 
furthermore support their article. The article, like with the K-Gruppen, shows that the movement 
became fed up with the actions of state and police against the left movement. 
The first three months of 1972 were already marked by intensified actions by the police and 
the government of which the left movement became clearly frustrated. The left movement described
the actions of the police as overreacting and believed that the police was in a state of panic in order 
to arrest the members of the RAF. It was already mentioned that the left movement believed the 
police would shoot first and ask questions later. Something that started with the death of Benno 
Ohnesorg and continued in 1971 with the death of Petra Schelm and Georg von Rauch. This idea 
was once again confirmed on 1 March 1972, when the 18 year old Richard Eppel was shot and 
killed by police after he fled in his car from a police control. Once more on 2 March 1972, when 
Thomas Weisbecker died after being shot during his arrest.  
154 FU Berlin, APO, nr 5 Konkret, 24 February 1972, p. 16 - 20 
64
The first newspaper to react on these incidents was the Rote Presse Korrespondenz on 10 
March 1972, in the article entitled ‘ZUR ERMORDUNG THOMAS WEISBECKERS’155 Reading the 
article it becomes clear that reporting about police excesses had become routine. Like with the death
of Georg von Rauch they believed the death of Thomas Weisbecker was carefully planned. They 
specifically wrote that no further explanation was needed. Besides that they made a short reference 
to the death of Richard Eppel. In both cases they claimed that there was no proof of criminal 
charges or a link with the RAF. The actions of the police were once more described as civil war 
tactics to ban the left movement. 
Roter Morgen wrote about the different incidents on 27 march 1972, in the article entitled; 
‘Die Polizei schlägt, würgt, tötet. Stoppt den Terror der staatlich lizensierten Killer!’156 Like the 
Rote Presse Korrespondenz, also Roter Morgen interpreted the developments as civil war tactics. 
Other than the Rote Presse Korrespondenz the Roter Morgen also compared the developments with 
the national socialist regime of the 1930s and 1940s. A comparison that was made more often. The 
article gives the most attention to describing the incident in the weeks preceding the article. It 
furthermore stated that foreign newspapers, in the Netherlands and Sweden, warned their 
inhabitants to drive carefully on German roads due to the skittish police officers. 
The responses from the K-Gruppen were a clear response to the large and disproportionate 
acts of the police and government towards the left movement. In their search to the RAF the police 
created an atmosphere where the situation easily spiraled out of control. These than lead to even 
stronger controls and a worsening of the whole situation in general. 
The last two articles about the counter actions of the police before the series of bomb attacks
in May 1972, were from Konkret and Roter Morgen. On 6 April 1972, Konkret published an article 
about the death of Richard Eppel. Opposed to the articles in the Rote Presse Korrespondenz, this 
article gave a clearer picture of the events that led to the death of Richard Eppel. The article 
described the incident in such a way that both sides could be understood, at least partially. The 
article is fully understanding of how Eppel reacted to a control while driving drunk without a 
drivers license. The initial decision of the police to chase Eppel after he ignored a police control  
was criticized, but the articles seems to have a certain sympathy for the fact that the police officer 
following Eppel, was emotionally influenced when he thought one of his colleagues was critically 
wounded due to the actions of Eppel. The main critique against the actions of the police was, 
however, the fact that after the police officer shot his firearm empty and missed the car Richard 
Eppel was driving, he used a machine gun with the immediate death of Eppel as a consequence. 
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The Roter Morgen also responded to a shooting with a casualty as a consequence on 10 
April 1972. The article gave a statement after the arrest of Grashof. During the arrest of Grasshof 
there was a shooting between Grashof and the police with a police fatality as a result. The way 
Roter Morgen wrote about the other media, it seemed that other media and the government blamed 
Grashof of shooting and killing a police officer. The Roter Morgen stated the exact opposite, 
claiming the police shot first and Grashof only shot to defend himself. With this it seems that they 
tried to switch the perpetrator and victim role within the ongoing feud between the left movement 
and the Government. 
The articles in the different newspapers of the left movement showed that the fear of 
prosecution of the left became more real with the passing of time. It also showed that due to the 
shootings in early 1972 the news about these shootings became routine. The one newspaper that did
not respond to the actions by the police and authorities during the first few months of 1972 was 
Vorwärts. As mentioned before this was probably linked to the connection between Vorwärts and 
the SPD. The actions taken by the government to find the RAF became more intense in 1971 and 
1972. Besides that, the number of casualties, due to the intensified manhunt, rose from the end of 
1971 onwards. It is therefore possible that with the intensifying situation Vorwärts decided to no 
longer publish critical articles about the policies of the political party they represented.  
The bomb attacks in May 1972 were a turning point within the post-war German history and
the left movement. The RAF was no longer just a theoretical threat but had transformed into a 
terrorist group. For the left movement this initially meant a moment of silence. During most of May,
no newspaper from the left movement responded to the bomb attacks. Probably because they had to 
process what was happening and with not knowing when a bomb could go off and where there was 
a high amount of insecurity. This changed when the main actors were in custody and for a brief 
moment of time people thought that with the arrest the fear of the RAF was over. 
The responses on the actions of the authorities, however, did not stop with the arrests. The 
arrest caused for a new set of strong responses among the different groups within the left 
movement. The end of May and June were filled with responses from the left movement that mainly
existed out of accusing other groups of causing the radicalization or even of murder. 
The main group that was accused by all the groups but especially by Konkret were the 
populist media in the form of the Axel Springer group. On 31 May 1972, Konkret described how the
populist media did not pay attention to the daily casualties due to work related accidents or car 
crashes. To sum it up the article blames Capitalism for mass murder and accused the populist media 
of ignoring that but that the bomb attacks with four casualties as a consequence caused fear and 
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chaos.157 Something that was emphasized in the article entitled; ‘Faßt die Springer-Gruppe!’158
Vorwärts targeted the CDU/CSU. From the two articles Vorwärts published in June 1972, in 
regards to the bomb attacks in May 1972, it becomes clear that the CDU/CSU had blamed the SPD 
of causing the radicalization of the RAF. Vorwärts therefore accused Strauß (the president of the 
CSU) of using the attacks for his own benefit against the government.159 The articles furthermore 
claimed that it was the CDU/CSU that caused the radicalization of the groups due to their own 
persistence on stronger counter measures taken by the police.160
The three newspapers of the K-Gruppen all had their own focus after the bomb attacks. The 
Rote Presse Korrespondenz distinctly focused on the measures taken by the authorities against the 
lawyers of the RAF members. They published several articles about the lawyer Otto Schily. The 
government suspected Schily of being a member of the RAF, or at least distributing their messages 
to one another. He therefore was also targeted by legal measures. The Rote Presse Korrespondenz 
saw this as a political prosecution, the same as with Horst Mahler. 
The Rote Fahne targeted the advantages the attacks gave the government. According to the 
Rote Fahne, the government benefited from the actions because it was a demonstration of the police
power and they were now able to pass new oppressive laws.161 The Rote Fahne accused the 
government of knowing the storage location of the bombs for several weeks before the arrest. The 
Rote Fahne therefore claimed that the authorities could have prevented the bomb attacks by 
arresting the RAF members earlier. That this did not happen was proof for the Rote Fahne that the 
authorities used the attacks for their own benefit. Although they did not literally wrote it, they 
indirectly blamed the government of the bomb attacks.
The Roter morgen, opposed to the Rote Fahne, did accuse the government directly of 
Murder. Not because of the attacks, as mentioned in chapter two, the Roter Morgen, although 
critical of some of the targets, supported the attacks against the military bases. Similar like Konkret, 
the Roter Morgen used examples of situations that caused people to die on a daily basis. For 
examples they mentioned casualties as a result of car crashes, work related casualties and suicides. 
Other than Konkret, that blamed the populist media of ignoring these deaths, the Roter Morgen 
blamed the government of causing these deaths.162 
The responses to the bomb attacks and the arrests of the main members of the RAF show 
one large similarity and that is that every group within the left movement used the attacks and the 
157 FU Berlin, APO, nr 12 Konkret, 31 May 1972, p. 3
158 FU Berlin, APO, nr 13 Konkret, 15 June 1972, p. 5
159 Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, nr 23 Vorwärts, 1 June 1972, p. 1
160 Staatsbibliothek zu Berlin, nr 24 Vorwärts, 8 June 1972, p. 8
161 FU Berlin, APO, nr 46 Rote Fahne, 7 June 1972; FU Berlin, APO, nr 47 Rote Fahne, 14 June 1972, p. 1
162 FU Berlin, APO, nr 12 Roter Morgen, 19 June 1972, p. 1 - 2
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actions of the authorities to accuse other groups of causing the radicalization of the RAF, or using 
the attacks for their own benefit. It seems that with the attacks, the threat of the RAF that lasted two 
year, from one moment to the other the group became more than a theoretical threat. 
The counter actions of the police and government to tackle left radical violence proved to be
of great influence on the discourse within the left movement. Throughout the period between 14 
May 1970 and June 1972 the measures taken by the police and government did not only cause a 
response from the left movement but also caused the left movement to alter its discourse. Unlike in 
chapter two, where the main responses were centered around the escape of Baader and the arrest of 
the main members of the RAF, the responses to the actions of the police and government were more
spread over the years.
The escape of Baader in 1970 did not only cause a strong response from the left movement 
towards left radical violence, it also immediately caused for critique towards the police and 
government. The K-Gruppen and Agit 883 claimed the police knew about the escape plans in 
advance. They therefore interpreted the escape as an action that is not only helping the police in its 
fight against communism, but that the police let it happen on purpose. Konkret did not accuse the 
police for letting it happen on purpose but they did agree on the idea that the escape was helping the
police and government in their wish to ban parts of the left movement. Vorwärts mainly used the 
escape to criticize their political opponents, the CDU/CSU and the anarchist wing of the APO. Their
response furthermore gave the idea of damage control towards the political constituency. 
The critique against the measures taken by the police and government were particularly 
strong among the members of the K-Gruppen. The rest of 1970 it were therefore mainly the 
newspapers of the K-gruppen that wrote about the police actions. Something that stood out in their 
response is that there was an element of fear of what could come. The members of the K-Gruppen 
were aware that the communist party was already banned in 1956 and that a new ban was always a 
possibility. Besides that they feared prosecution due to their opinion about certain topics. The idea 
that the police were using the escape to their own advantage and the fear therefore were an element 
in every response about the measures taken by the police and government. 
1971 turned out to be the year that symbolized the stronger measures taken by the police and
government against left radical violence. The acts that symbolized those measures where the 
labeling of the RAF as state enemy number one, the court case against Mahler and the shooting of 
Georg von Rauch at the end of that year. The shooting of Petra Schelm, on the other hand, did not 
cause for strong open reactions from the left movement. 
The K-Gruppen and Agit 883 were the newspapers that had the strongest responses to the 
measures. With every of the previous mentioned incidents in 1971 the K-Gruppen saw their fear 
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confirmed that the police and government where using the escape and actions of the RAF to ban 
communism and socialism. Agit 883, after another internal change, joined the K-Gruppen in their 
fear. Besides the fear that was visible in the articles they often compared the government and police 
of their time with the Nazi regime. This was especially strong during the case against Mahler.  
The death of Georg von Rauch caused shock waves through the left movement that 
continued in 1972, due to the changing statements of the police about the events that lead to his 
death. This shock continued in February when the government announced the RadiKalen Gesetze. 
With the announcement of these laws they feared consequences, that was initially shown by the K-
Gruppen and Agit 883, started to spread to the members of Konkret. The first few months of 1972 
would furthermore show that most of the groups within the left movement were fed up with the 
large, expensive and ineffective acts of the police to find the members of the RAF. A critique that 
was even expressed by Vorwärts. The responses to the numerous shootings and several deaths 
before May 1972 showed that the left movement was not surprised anymore by these excesses. 
In May 1972 the newspapers of the left movement initially stayed silent about the attacks 
and the counter actions of the police until the end of May. Many of the responses from the left 
movement fitted with the responses to the escape of Baader in 1970. The K-Gruppen focused on the
statements of the police that they apparently already knew about some of the hiding and storing 
locations of the RAF for several weeks, but were not able to arrest the members before. According 
to the K-Gruppen the police could have stopped the bomb attacks but did not do so. They linked 
this to their normal critique that the police could use these incidents to prosecute the left movement.
Next to the critique of the K-Gruppen towards the police, most of the newspapers within the 
left movement started to blame others for causing the radicalization of parts of the left and therefore
the bomb attacks. Vorwärst focused on their political opponent, the CDU/CSU and Konkret accused
Axel Springer and his populist newspapers of causing the radicalization. 
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Conclusion
The central question to be answered in this research is the following; How was the discourse
in the German left movement affected by violence from left radicals, and the counter violence from 
the state in the period 1970 – 1972? In order to answer this question the previous chapters 
described the development of West-Germany, how violence from the left radicals influenced the 
discourse within the left movement, and how the counter actions of the state and police influenced 
the discourse. With these three chapters combined I will try to provide an answer to the 
aforementioned mentioned question. 
The development of the West German government in the time period 1945 and 1970 was of 
great influence on the creation and development of the West German left movement. The Cold War 
and the threat of a nuclear war was the first reason for people in West Germany and all over the 
world to protest. Mainly the possible reinstatement of the draft and the stationing of nuclear 
weapons on West German soil was the cause of concern. After two World Wars, started by 
Germany, the West German population did not want to be caught up in yet another war. It led to 
demonstrations that reached a peak in 1958 with the movement, 'Kampf dem Atomtod'. The 
movement did not achieve their goals since the draft was reinstated and atomic weapons were 
placed on German soil, but the seeds for the 1960s protest movement were planted.
During the 1960s new developments initiated a growth of the protest movement. On a 
national scale it were the national socialist past and the development of the emergency laws that 
caused for people to protest against the authorities. On an international scale it were imperialism 
and especially the Vietnam war, led by the United States, that led people to protest. The protest 
movement furthermore was heavily influenced by socialism and communism, something that 
caused extra conflict between the protest movement and the authorities due to the Cold War.
Between 1966 and 1968 the protest movement was strong throughout West Germany and 
referred to as the APO. This was due to their role after the opposition lost power and the forming of 
the great coalition between the SPD and the CDU/CSU. The protests, however, often resulted in 
violence between the police and the protesters. Events like the killing of Benno Ohnesorg by a 
police officer after a demonstration against the visit of the Shah of Iran on 7 June 1967, turned 
violent, and the shooting of Rudi Dutschke after he was defamed by populist newspapers of Axel 
Springer, caused for a great distrust between the the protest movement and the authorities. The 
shooting of Rudi Dutschke even led to the most violent protests in the BRD. The passing of the 
emergency laws, however, generated the disintegration of the protest movement, starting from the 
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second half of 1968. 
The disintegration of the protest movement, between 1968 and 1970, was the result of the 
passing of the emergency laws and teenagers without political experience joining the left movement
causing a new generation conflict within the movement. The more experienced part of the protest 
movement had difficulties with the more action oriented newcomers. The youth that joined the 
protest movement during 1968 was more focused on the protests themselves than on the actual goal 
of the protests, causing for conflicts between the members of the movement and therefore adding to 
the disintegration of the movement. This meant that, although the movement had fallen apart, the 
conflicts between the left movement and the police continued during the late 1960s, into the 1970s. 
Already before the escape of Baader the actions of the left were scrutinized and criticized 
within and by the left movement.  It was, however, the escape of Baader on 14 May 1970, that 
resulted in many strong responses within the left movement. The K-Gruppen were the first to 
criticize the escape and immediately distanced themselves from it. Konkret reacted with long 
articles, in which they criticized the action but at the same time had troubles with how to react to the
participation in the escape of their former journalist, Ulrike Meinhof. Like the K-Gruppen, Konkret 
criticized the action and like the other newspapers described how the escape of Baader would only 
harm the left movement instead of helping the movement. The response of Vorwärts was short and 
typical for a political party in the coalition, describing how this action would only help their 
political opponent, the CDU. The only positive response to the escape of Baader came from Agit 
883. The magazine criticized the other newspapers of judging the escape without knowing the 
motives behind it. They shortly after this published the first document of the RAF. 
The immediate reactions after the escape of Baader were to the escape itself and how this 
was not beneficial for the left wing movement. Soon after these initial reactions, however, the left 
newspapers wrote about the actions of the authorities and the police. Within the K-Gruppen there 
existed the idea that the police knew about the escape and instead of preventing it they let it happen 
so they could cover up their own mistakes that were made during protests in the weeks before. The 
idea that the escape only helped the police, or was used by the police, was widely spread among the 
left movement and besides Vorwärts, all the news papers came to this conclusion. Konkret criticized
the fact that in the aftermath is was mainly Ulrike Meinhof that was pictured on the wanted posters 
and not Baader, the person that actually escaped. 
For the rest of 1970 it was mainly the arrest of Mahler that took attention from the media. 
The arrest of Mahler, Schubert and Goergens was seen as a political act to prosecute the left instead 
of an arrest of criminals. Especially Mahler, as the former lawyer of the APO, got frequent news 
coverage due to his arrest and the trail held against him. The trial against Mahler was seen as an act 
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to demotivate other lawyers to defend people from the left movement. 
With the strong responses to the escape of Baader it is surprising that the left newspapers 
kept relatively quiet about other acts committed by the RAF. The left newspapers, for instance, did 
not react to the bank robberies committed by the RAF. The lack of attention for the RAF and left 
extremist violence most likely had to do with two factors. First, after the escape the members of the 
RAF kept a low profile and focused on preparation for the future. They went to the Middle East for 
Guerrilla training and upon their return they stayed in hiding. Second, the bank robberies were 
probably a necessary act to finance their underground stay, not a political act. Furthermore, it is 
possible that the members of the left movement discussed the topic more in small groups, rather 
than via the newspapers, to avoid negative attention from the police. 
The actions of the police, on the other hand, and the arrest of Mahler, Schubert and 
Goergens were better covered within the newspapers of the left movement. The K-Gruppen and 
Agit 883 criticized the police and government on a regular basis, already before the escape. The 
counter actions of the police only gave them more reasons to do so. Konkret also frequently 
criticized the actions of the police and Vorwärts would do so if it fitted in their political goal. 
In 1971, the discourse about left radical violence within the left media had almost died out. 
Events like bank robberies the on 15 January 1971, the shooting in which Petra Schelm was killed, 
the death of a police officer during the arrest of Margret Schiller and the death of another police 
officer during a bank robbery on 22 December 1971, were almost completely ignored by the left 
press. In regards to the death of Petra Schelm only Vorwärts and Rote Morgen dedicated an article 
to it, but also these articles had nothing to do with the discourse about violence within the left wing.
The discourse about the authorities and police, on the other hand, was very much alive in 
1971. This started with a reaction from the Rote Presse Korrespondenz to the fact that the RAF was 
declared state enemy number one on 13 February 1971. Something that according to the Rote 
Presse Korrespondenz only had to do with the fact that this way, it was easier for the government to 
prosecute people from the left movement. In March 1971 the case against Mahler was widely 
covered by the left press and seen as a political process against the left in general. Something else 
that draw the attention of the left press were the lock downs of cities in order to find the members of
the RAF. Something that was described in all the newspapers. Actions that, according to all the 
newspapers, were highly exaggerated, even according to Vorwärts. 
It was the shooting of Georg von Rauch and his death in December 1971, that sparked the 
largest response within the left movement about the actions of the police and the authorities. All the 
newspapers that were used for this research described how the police changed its story of the event 
day by day. The tape recording of the emergency call made by the elderly couple, that witnessed the
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event, was printed in several newspapers. The comparison between the death of Benno Ohnesorg 
and the death of Georg von Rauch was made quickly, and fears that the police would now just shoot
left people without warning started to spread through the left wing movement, especially among the
K-Gruppen.    
The first few months of 1972 were still covered by the aftermath of the death of Georg von 
Rauch and the worsening situation between the police and the left movement. Except for Vorwärts, 
the newspaper articles in the left media showed that the members were fed up with the search 
actions to find the members of the RAF. The Radikalen Gesetze fed the fear of prosecution of the 
left movement by the police that already lived among the K-Gruppen. That fear, furthermore, spread
to readers of Konkret. The discourse within the left movement, except for Vorwärts, was fully 
dominated by the measures taken by the police and government.
This changed during and after May 1972, when the RAF committed the bomb attacks in 
which several people died and many were wounded. It seems that the left wing press initially did 
not know how to react since the first responses from Konkret, Vorwärts and Rote Fahne to the 
attacks were from the last week of May, where as the first bomb attacks were already committed on 
11 May 1972. The rest of the newspapers only published articles after Baader, Meins and Raspe 
were arrested on 1 June 1972. The majority of the left press was against the attacks and started to 
describe the RAF as a right wing group, since, in their opinion, this had nothing to do with the left 
wing movement. 
Something that immediately appeared in all the newspapers is that, right from the start, they 
combined their responses to the attacks committed by the RAF with the way the police and 
authorities reacted. Al the news papers used for this research, including Vorwärts, were critical 
about the role of the police and claimed that the attacks were beneficial for either police and 
authorities or political opponents. It is furthermore interesting that the debate about the attacks was 
relatively short. With the arrest of the main members of the RAF in the first halve of June 1972, the 
majority of the articles were about the arrest of the RAF members and the actions of the police. The 
K-Gruppen pledged solidarity with the lawyers that were now involved in the process and all the 
news papers described how innocent left people were effected by the actions of the police. 
To return to the original question, it becomes clear that left wing extremist violence affected 
the discourse within the left movement. This research shows that, although, parts of the left 
movement in West Germany in the early 1970s frequently spoke of the use of violence, the majority
was against the actual violence shown by the RAF. This form of violence was seen as 
counterproductive towards the left and the working class, since it were individual actions. From the 
moment Baader escaped there was fear among the left movement that these actions would be 
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beneficial to the police and authorities and would be used against the left. The discourse was, 
furthermore heavily affected by the counter action of the police and authorities. Due to the heavy 
measures taken by the police and authorities the discourse within the left movement focused more 
on their actions and the consequences for the left movement than on the actual violence of left wing 
extremists. After the escape of Baader and the initial critical responses within the left movement the
focus of the debate moves to the actions of the police and authorities and from 1971 forward this 
became their main focus. 
It furthermore seems that it was difficult for the left movement to have an open discourse 
about violence in their newspapers, since their actions and writings were monitored by the police 
and authorities. Therefore, I have to refer back to a comment from the introduction, in which I 
explain that, although, newspapers are the most representative source for this research, one has to 
keep in mind that the writers were aware of the fact that the authorities could also read the articles. 
With the risk of being banned as an organization or of being arrested, it is likely that a majority of 
the writers of the articles did have this notion in the back of their minds and that the discourse might
have been slightly different in their personal discussions. 
It is highly likely that the members of the left movement were more positive about the RAF 
in their personal discussions than was portrayed in the articles. Incidents like the death of Petra 
Schelm most certainly were talked about within left circles and some might even have been positive
about the casualties on the side of the police and the American military. These answers, however, 
can most likely only be found in interviews with people that were there. Whether the newspapers 
represented the full opinion of the left movement, or only parts, it did show that the devision of the 
ideological landscape within the left movement changed due to the events between 1970 and 1972. 
Towards the outside world the newspapers had to make their positions clear on topics like the RAF 
and violence. 
The time frame for this research is set between 1970 and 1972 since that was the time frame 
in which the first generation of the RAF was active. After the arrest of the main members of the 
RAF the authorities, but probably also the majority of the left movement in West Germany, thought 
that they could close the chapter of left radical violence and terrorism. History, however, has taught 
us that this moment was short lived. The two decades after the arrest of the first generation of the 
RAF revealed two more generations of RAF and left radical violence. 
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